People v. Register’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

37 federal appellate · 15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 133 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]t has never been permissible in New York for a jury to convict a defendant of depraved indifference murder “where the evidence produced at trial indicated that if the defendant committed the homicide at all, he committed it with the conscious objective of killing the victim” (in the words of the first [and principal] question). As discussed at some length, however, under Register — and until we started to recast “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” post-Sanchez — where both intentional and depraved indifference murder were charged in one-on-one shootings or knifings, these counts were submitted to the jury for it to sort out the defendant’s state of mind unless there was absolutely no evidence whatsoever that the defendant might have acted unintentionally. That a defendant’s acts virtually guaranteed the victim’s death did not, in and of itself, preclude a guilty verdict on a theory of depraved indifference. To the contrary and as the dissenters in both Register and Sanchez vociferously protested, under the Register formulation the very facts establishing a risk of death approaching certainty and thus presenting compelling circumstantial evidence of intent — for example, a point-blank shooting of the victim in the head — likewise demonstrated depraved indifference. This was the law of the State of New York at the time defendant’s conviction became final.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Policano v. Herbert · Guzman v. Greene

2. “Murder in the second degree. Under our law, a person is guilty of murder in the second degree when, under circumstances showing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of that person. According to the law, a person acts recklessly with respect to another person’s death when that person engages in conduct which could create the substantial and unjustifiable and grave risk that another person’s death -wall occur, and when he is aware of and consciously disregards that risk, and when that risk is of such nature and degree that disregarding it is a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe in the same situation. A crime which is considered reckless is generally regarded as less serious and blameworthy than a crime committed intentionally. But when reckless conduct is engaged in under circumstances showing a depraved indifference to human life, the law regards that conduct as so serious, so egregious, as to be the equivalent of intentional conduct. Conduct showing a depraved indifference to human life is much more serious and blameworthy than conduct which is merely reckless. It is conduct that, beyond being reckless, is so wanton, so deficient in moral sense and concern, so devoid of regard for the life or lives of others, as to equal in blameworthiness as intentional conduct which produces the same result. In determining whether”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 955 F. Supp. 2d 92 - Walker v. Graham

3. “[T]he majority writing in Register does not hold that “ordinary recklessness” is sufficient to establish depraved indifference murder. Register requires a significantly heightened recklessness, distinguishing it from manslaughter in two ways. First, “in a depraved mind murder the actor’s conduct must present a grave risk of death whereas in manslaughter it presents the lesser substantial risk of death.” Then, it also requires proof of circumstances manifesting a depraved indifference to human life, focusing the injury, as we have seen, “upon an objective assessment of the degree of risk” which “converts the substantial risk present in manslaughter into a very substantial risk.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rivera v. Cuomo