60 So. 3d 326 - Morris v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2010
Citation profile
14
cited by 14 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
April 2016
most recently cited
13 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Barker v. Wingo · Neil v. Biggers · United States v. Young · Lockett v. Ohio · United States v. Marion
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“'Those states with statutes prohibiting the execution of a mentally retarded defendant require that a defendant, to be considered mentally retarded, must have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below), and significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior. Additionally, these problems must have manifested themselves during the developmental period (i.e., before the defendant reached age 18).' " Ex parte Perkins , 851 So.2d 453 , 456 (Ala.2002). "Similarly, in suggesting guidance for determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded so as to prohibit the defendant's execution, the Atkins Court discussed clinical definitions of mental retardation and concluded that these definitions 'require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18.' 536 U.S. at 318 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 . Further, '[i]mplicit in the definition is that the subaverage intellectual functioning and the deficits in adaptive behavior must be present at the time the crime was committed as well as having manifested themselves before age 18.' Smith v. State , 239 So.3d at 248.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Smith v. State · Calhoun v. State““The United States Supreme Court in Atkins provided guidelines for determining whether a person is mentally retarded to the extent that he or she should not be executed. However, the Court also held that ultimately the states should establish their own definitions. The Court stated: “ ‘To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. In this case, for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins suffers from mental retardation. Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national con sensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), with regard to insanity, “we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” Id., at 405, 416-417 .’”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Smith v. State · Calhoun v. State“'Mentally retarded person. A person with significant subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated with concurrent impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period, as measured by appropriate standardized testing instruments.'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Smith v. State · Calhoun v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.