Bogan v. Bogan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

122 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 124 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “that when an obligor’s retirement is objectively reasonable, it does constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances — irrespective of whether the retirement was foreseeable or voluntary — so as to permit modification of the support obligation. However, while bona fide retirement after a lifetime spent in the labor force is somewhat of an entitlement, an obligor cannot merely utter the word “retirement” and expect an automatic finding of a substantial and material change in circumstances. Rather, the trial court should examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the retirement to ensure that it is objectively reasonable. The burden of establishing that the retirement is objectively reasonable is on the party seeking modification of the award, cf. Seal v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990), and the trial court’s determination of reasonableness will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 360 . [[Image here]] However, even when an obligor is able to establish that a retirement is objectively reasonable, and therefore that it constitutes a substantial and material change in circumstances, the obligor is not necessarily entitled to an automatic reduction or termination of his or her support obligations. As evidenced by its permissive language, the statute permitting modification of support awards contemplates that a trial court has no duty to reduce or terminate an award merely because it finds a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Evans v. Young

2. “Because modification of a spousal support award is “factually driven and calls for a careful balancing of numerous factors,” Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989), a trial court’s decision to modify support payments is given “wide latitude” within its range of discretion, see Sannella v. Sannella, 993 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). In particular, the question of “[w]hether there has been a sufficient showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances is in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Watters v. Watters, 22 S.W.3d 817, 821 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “Appellate courts are generally disinclined to second-guess a trial judge’s spousal support decision unless it is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to the public policies reflected in the applicable statutes.” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 234 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998); see also Goodman v. Goodman, 8 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999) (“As a gen eral matter, we are disinclined to alter a trial court’s spousal support decision unless the court manifestly abused its discretion.”). When the trial court has set forth it factual findings in the record, we will presume the correctness of these findings so long as the evidence does not preponderate against them. See, e.g., Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tenn.2000); see also Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Evans v. Young

3. “the court finds that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible,” and is appropriate when: the disadvantaged spouse is unable to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the spouse’s standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36 — 5—121(f)(1). 3 . Husband did testify that "the economy went down.” However, this testimony was in the context of his operation of the pest control franchise and not the restaurant. 4 . The accountant reported that, in 2010, Husband would also receive the final installment payment from the sale of the Orkin franchise, totaling $10,874. 5 . We have taken the proceeds of sale of the Orkin franchise into account in our discussion of Husband's earning capacity, infra. 6 . Husband testified that, at the time of the divorce, he was taking medication for high blood pressure; since the divorce, he had a stent put in his heart, was diagnosed as "diabetic 2,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Marsha Bordes v. Julian Bordes