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← 601 F.2d 921 - United States v. Mavrick

United States v. Mavrick’s Empirical Analysis

601 F.2d 921 · 1979

Citation profile

62
cited by 62 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
10
states following
September 2007
most recently cited

31 federal appellate · 2 district · 12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 62 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2007 · most notably Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), United States v. Shue (1985)

31 federal appellate · 2 district · 12 state decisions — followed in 10 states

4401979198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1708 · 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Livestock Fraud Protection Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 659

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Glasser v. United States · Doyle v. Ohio · Morissette v. United States · Harris v. New York

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “to a full not just a selective development of that subject,”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “Although the defendant’s testimony would not permit the government to argue that his post-arrest silence was inconsistent with his claim of innocence, we hold it did permit the government to attempt to discredit his testimony by showing that he was given such an opportunity and did not take advantage of it. We find nothing fundamentally unfair to the defendant in permitting the government to correct an impression that the defendant created by his own testimony.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the defendant’s testimony as to his behavior following arrest.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.