Commonwealth v. Reed’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

48 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]n order -to obtain relief based on [an ineffective assistance -of counsel (“IAC”) ] claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error such that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Com. v. Steckley, S., Jr. · Commonwealth v. Perry

2. “[W]e ... conclude that the filing of an appellate brief, défícient in some aspect or another, does not constitute a complete failure to function as a client’s advocate so as to warrant a presumption of prejudice under Cronic. Unlike the case in Lantzy, Halley, and Liebel, ... Reed’s direct appeal counsel’s conduct in the instant case did not deprive Reed of his,constitutional right to appeal. Significantly, Reed’s direct appeal counsel filed a timely notice of appeal, which was docketed with the prothonotary. Although the Superior Court ... opined that counsel’s failure to provide appropriate citation to authority and a copy of the notes of testimony resulted in waiver of Reed’s argument, the court did not quash Reed’s appeal. Indeed, the issues apparently were sufficiently presented to allow the. court to address the merits of Reed’s arguments, as the court indicated that it reviewed the evidence and the record. ... At most, the Superior Court’s review of Reed’s arguments on the record before it may be viewed as a “narrowing of the ambit” of Reed’s appeal. Moreover, to extend the [doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel per se] to eases involving a defect in an appellate brief essentially would transform the exception' into a rule, as many appellate briefs contain at least one arguable defect.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Rosado · 2011 Pa. Super. 141 - Commonwealth v. Fink

3. “While the parties herein use “presumption of prejudice,” “presumed prejudice,” and “per se prejudice” in discussing the third prong of the test for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in Pierce, we conclude that, for all practical purposes, all of the terms have the same meaning. Specifically, inherent in each of the terms is the recognition by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), that there are some circumstances so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. Id. at 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 (on some occasions, the likelihood that counsel could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial). In the past, this Court has used the terms interchangeably in the same context.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2011 Pa. Super. 44 - Commonwealth v. Brown