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← 602 F.3d 1263 - Powell v. Allen

Powell v. Allen’s Empirical Analysis

602 F.3d 1263 · 2010

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
August 2022
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Appellate journey

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Batson v. Kentucky · Williams v. Taylor · Wainwright v. Sykes · Wiggins v. Smith, Warden

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[0]nly when counsels’ choices are made after a “thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options” are those choices “virtually unchallengeable.” [Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 691, 104 S.Ct. [at 2066]. When, however, “strategic choices [are] made after less than complete investigation [they] are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690-91 , 104 S.Ct. [at 2066]. Thus, at bottom, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances ....” Id. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. [at 2066]. This means that when we assess the attorney’s decision not to investigate, we “must consider ... whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 , 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527 , [2538,] 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[The] AEDPA limits our review to whether the state court’s determination that [the petitioner] failed to plead sufficient facts in his Rule 32 petition to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Thus, we look only to the allegations in [the petitioner’s] Rule 32 petition and whether those allegations sufficiently state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The Rule 32 court, affirmed by the state appellate court, found that [petitioner] failed to plead facts on which an ineffective assistance claim could be based and, for that reason, denied [petitioner’s] claim and request for an evidentiary hearing. See Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 1113 , 1125 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (only when “facts are pleaded, which, if true, entitle a petitioner to relief, [is] the petitioner then entitled to an opportunity, as provided in Rule 32.9, Ala. R.Crim. P., to present evidence proving those alleged facts.” (citing Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.6) (emphasis omitted)). We thus review the Rule 32 court’s rejection of [petitioner’s] claim as a holding on the merits. Judd [v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308 , 1313 (11th Cir.2001)]; Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 858 , 860 (5th Cir.1997) (finding no procedural bar from state court ruling on similar pleading rule because the ruling “require[d] some evaluation, howev er, cursory, of the merits of a petitioner’s claim”).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.