Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

602 F.3d 788

Docket No. 10-3464.

Durr v. Strickland

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided April 18, 2010.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 2010-04-18

Cited by 8 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2018

1 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

2 counsel of record

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 301 (Animal Drug Amendments of 1968) · 21 U.S.C. § 801 (§ 101 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2010-04-18

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*789Kathleen A. McGarry, McGarry Law Office, Glorieta, NM, Dennis Lyle Sipe, Buell & Sipe, Marietta, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

¶2Charles L. Wille, Stephen E. Maher, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Defendants-Appellees.

¶3Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and COLE, Circuit Judges.

¶4ORDER

¶5Darryl Durr, an Ohio inmate scheduled to be executed on April 20, 2010, pursuant to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol, appeals from the district court’s order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss his complaint.1 The complaint alleged that the use of sodium thiopental, or in the alternative midazolam and hydromorphone, as a means of execution violate the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801et seq., the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301et seq., and various federal regulations associated with these Acts. The complaint sought a declaration that an execution using these drugs without a prescription from a licensed medical practitioner and distributed without proper authorization violates these acts. On April 15, 2010, Judge Frost ruled held that declaratory relief was unavailable to Durr because no private right of action exists under either act. Further, even assuming that Durr could pursue such a cause of action, he failed to allege any facts to support his claim that Defendants’ failure to adhere to federal law subjects him to a risk of inhumane execution or to suggest that the declaratory judgment that he seeks would deter the State from proceeding with his execution.

¶6Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and the applicable law, we agree with Judge Frost that this action for declaratory relief is not the proper mechanism for seeking injunctive relief from execution. We therefore AFFIRM the order of Judge Frost, for the reasons stated in his April 15, 2010 opinion and order. SO ORDERED.

/602/f3d/788 · .json · Public domain