Hayward v. Marshall’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 150 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[subsequent to Hayward’s denial of parole, and subsequent to our oral argument in this case, the California Supreme Court established in two decisions, In re Lawrence [ 44 Cal.4th 1181 , 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535, 549 (Cal.2008) ] and In re Shaputis, [ 44 Cal.4th 1241 , 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 , 190 P.3d 573, 582 (Cal.2008) ] that as a matter of state law, “some evidence” of future dangerousness is indeed a state sine qua non for denial of parole in California. We delayed our decision in this case so that we could study those decisions and the supplemental briefs by counsel addressing them. As a matter of California law, “the paramount consideration for both the Board [of Prison Terms] and the Governor under the governing statutes is whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety.” [Lawrence, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d at 552.] There must be “some evidence” of such a threat, and an aggravated offense “does not, in every case, provide evidence that the inmate is a current threat to public safety.” [Id., 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d at 554.] The prisoner’s aggravated offense does not establish current dangerousness “unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state” supports the inference of dangerousness. [Id., 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d at 555.] Thus, in California, the offense of conviction may be considered, but the consideration must address the det”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Holder v. Curry · 735 F. Supp. 2d 1178 - Sanchez v. Curry

2. “The California parole statute provides that the Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual.” The crucial determinant of whether the prisoner gets parole in California is “consideration of the public safety.” In California, when a prisoner receives an indeterminate sentence of fifteen years to life, the “indeterminate sentence is in legal effect a sentence for the maximum term, subject only to the ameliorative power of the [parole authority] to set a lesser term.” Under the California parole scheme, the prisoner has a right to a parole hearing and various procedural guarantees and rights before, at, and after the hearing; a right to subsequent hearings at set intervals if the Board of Prison Terms turns him down for parole; and a right to a written explanation if the Governor exercises his authority to overturn the Board of Prison Terms’ recommendation for parole. Under California law, denial of parole must be supported by “some evidence,” but review of the [decision to deny parole] is “extremely deferential.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Holder v. Curry · 735 F. Supp. 2d 1178 - Sanchez v. Curry

3. “[T]he aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner’s dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense remain probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public safety.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cooke v. Solis · 721 F. Supp. 2d 891 - Lopez v. Curry