Nimmo v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1979
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 41 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 43 later decisions — most recently July 2014 · most notably Grabill v. State (1980), Carfield v. State (1982)
1 federal appellate · 41 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 281
Relies on Mackay v. Nesbett · Campbell v. United States · 55 Ill. 2d 443 - People v. Peter · State v. Watkins · Cohen v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“This court could merely rely upon the word “false” in upholding the constitutionality of the statute. Black’s Law Dictionary, pp. 721-722 (Rev. 4th Ed., 1968), demonstrates that when the word is used in varying situations it is given different definitions. However, the word is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, in this manner: “In law, this word usually means something more than untrue; it means something designedly untrue and deceitful, and implies an intention to perpetrate some treachery or fraud. ...” This definition has been adopted in Lanier v. State, Alaska, 448 P.2d 587, 593 (1968); and Wilensky v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 1st Cir., 67 F.2d 389, 390 (1933). Commonwealth v. Kraatz, 2 Mass.App. 196 , 310 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1974), not only adopts this definition, but makes the following observation: “... The term ‘false’ has generally been interpreted as connoting intentional untruth. [Citing authorities.]...””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Monastero““ * * * We have recognized before that an improper limitation of cross-examination may not be prejudicial. [Citation.] While it must be conceded that a defendant has an absolute right to cross-examine a witness about anything which was the subject of direct examination, there is a distinction between a denial of cross-examination and its limitation. The extent and manner of a witness’ cross-examination in such cases is in the court’s discretion. [Citations.] A trial court’s discretionary ruling on evidence will not be upset except for clear abuse which is appellant’s burden to demonstrate. [Citations.]” Id. (Emphasis added.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Buhrle v. State“Although the term, false swearing, is used interchangeably with perjury, there is a definite distinction, both at common law and under usual statutory schemes. The principal distinguishing factor is that perjury is committed only in a judicial proceeding whereas false swearing is not necessarily committed in a judicial proceeding but is rather the giving of false statement under oath.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.