Sours v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1980
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 127 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 134 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2024 · most notably Missouri v. Hunter (1983), State v. Haggard (1981)
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 127 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002) · 18 U.S.C. § 2314 · 18 U.S.C. § 371 · 18 U.S.C. § 846 · 18 U.S.C. § 848
Relies on Blockburger v. United States · North Carolina v. Pearce · Wainwright v. Sykes · Benton v. Maryland · Brown v. Ohio
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 134 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"First, that on or about May 17, 1979 a certain person, armed with a deadly weapon, with the aid or attempted aid of defendant committed the offense of robbery in the first degree of Rose Mary Davis, and "Second, that the defendant, either before or during the commission of the offense of robbery in the first degree with the purpose of promoting its commission, aided such other person in committing that offense, and "Third, that on or about May 17, 1979 in the County of Jackson, State of Missouri, the defendant or a certain person stole miscellaneous United States Currency in the charge of Rose Mary Davis, and "Fourth, that the defendant or a certain person in doing so threatened the immediate use of physical force on or against Rose Mary Davis for the purpose of preventing resistance to the taking of the property, and "Fifth, that in the course of stealing the property, the defendant or a certain person, a participant with the defendant in the crime, was armed with a deadly weapon, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count III of robbery in the first degree. "However, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense. "If you do find the defendant guilty under Count III of robbery in the first degree, then you will assess and declare the punishment at: "1. Life imprisonment, or "2. Imprisonment for a term of years fixed by you but not less than ten ye”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. State v. Fletcher · State v. Lewis“for further consideration in light of Albernaz ....”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The Supreme Court in Sours I stated: Having determined that a conviction for both robbery first degree and armed criminal action places a defendant twice in jeopardy by multiplying the punishment for one offense, we must consider the appropriate remedy. The armed criminal action statute provides in three separate subsections for sentences of not less than three years for the first offense of armed criminal action, not less than five years for the second offense, and not less than ten years for the third. § 559.225, RSMo Supp. 1976. Each subsection contains the sentence: ‘The punishment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to any punishment provided by law for the crime committed by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon.’ Our determination that the description of the offense of armed criminal action includes all of the elements of the underlying felony requires that the statute be construed as if this sentence were stricken from each subsection, since the double jeopardy clause prohibits imposing punishment for both armed criminal action and for the underlying felony. We reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it denied appellant relief from his conviction for armed criminal action; we affirm the judgment of the trial court insofar as it denied appellant relief from his conviction for robbery first degree. Appellant’s conviction for armed criminal action is hereby set aside.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Hutchinson v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.