¶1concurring.
¶2I would base the reversal in this case solely on the prosecutor’s failure to disclose information that bore directly on the credibility and possible bias of the witness George Redhead, and his patently false suggestion to the jury, in final argument, that Redhead had no motive to fabricate. Such conduct, in my opinion, violated not only the disclosure provisions of law cited by the majority, but also the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary Rule 7-102 provides in part: “(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . (3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal . [or] (5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.” Since I cannot say, with fair assurance, that the jury was not substantially swayed by the prosecutor’s action, I think that action alone requires reversal of Carman’s conviction. Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969).