Penley v. Eslinger’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 77 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of a precise definition or mechanical application, [citation omitted], ... its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wate v. Kubler · 903 F. Supp. 2d 1228 - McElroy v. City of Birmingham

2. “'[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others,' use of deadly force does not violate the Constitution.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Morton v. Kirkwood · Varnadore v. Merritt

3. “[W]e found no violation of the Fourth Amendment when a high speed chase that followed a traffic violation ended with four police vehicles cornering the suspect’s car in a cul-de-sac. The suspect had stopped his car, which faced the .curb, and was still in the vehicle. The officers shouted to get out of the car, then, “[w]ithin a moment of [the suspect’s] car stopping (at most, a very few seconds), [one deputy] — from a position in front of [the suspect’s] car — fired two shots ... through the front wind shield.” This Court found that because the suspect drove recklessly, never left his automobile, and never turned off its engine, reasonable police officers would have “probable cause to believe that [the car] had become a deadly weapon with which [the suspect] was armed.” So, despite the fact that the suspect “did not try to run over the deputies and that [the suspect], in the cul-de-sac, did not aim the car at the deputies,” we concluded that the suspect “would have appeared to reasonable police officers to have been gravely dangerous.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 77 F. Supp. 3d 1271 - Small v. Glynn County