Commonwealth v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A person is guilty of first degree murder where the Commonwealth proves: (1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the person accused is responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted with specific intent to kill. See 18 Pa. C.S. 2502(a)[.] An intentional killing is a “[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. 2502(d). “The Commonwealth may prove that a killing was intentional solely through circumstantial evidence. The finder of fact may infer that the defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim based on the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 596 Pa. 510 , 946 A.2d 645, 651 (2008) (citations omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Thomas · 2010 Pa. Super. 114 - Commonwealth v. Bozic

2. “As the trial court aptly noted, an in-court identification is essentially witness testimony which points a condemning finger at the accused during trial. Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/08, at 12 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fowler, 466 Pa. 198 , 352 A.2d 17 , 20 (1976) ). During her testimony, Angela Sutton described the shooter's physical attributes and actions; she also stated she saw the man the police had in custody and noticed he was not wearing the same thing he had on when he shot the victim. Appellant's argument is that Ms. Sutton's descriptions constitute an identification because the jury had to be aware she was describing appellant. Indeed, the agreement specifically permitted descriptive testimony and prohibited identification testimony - that these two terms were distinguished in the agreement itself belies appellant's argument that Sutton's description constituted a de facto identification. Appellant cannot first agree to allow descriptive testimony and then object to unfavorable descriptions. A true identification would have violated a pre-trial agreement that she would not be asked to identify him. However, Ms. Sutton did not identify the accused, but only described the scene as she observed it-which is precisely what was agreed to by both parties on the record. Ms. Sutton explicitly told the jury she did not see the shooter's face long enough to make an actual identification and was only describing her observations of the man in the back of the police car. N.T. Trial, ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Brown

3. “On December 10, 2003, [Brown], then age 24, and Rahsaan Anderson [ ("Anderson") ] were standing on Girard Avenue in Philadelphia, near a school, subway station, gas station, and restaurant. Around 3:00 p.m., [Brown] saw Robert Crawford [ ("Crawford") ] crossing Girard Avenue, and stated, "There go that pussy." N.T., 5/26/2005, at 33. [Brown] approached Crawford and, without provocation, shot him multiple times in the back. After shooting Crawford, [Brown] and Anderson began to run but were quickly deterred by two police officers in a patrol vehicle. One officer stopped and frisked Anderson, but found no weapon. The second officer saw [Brown] across the street with his right hand in his jacket pocket and ordered him multiple times to show his hands. [Brown] refused to remove his hand from his pocket and instead ran back toward the crime scene and down an alley. The officer pursued him, commanding him to stop. [Brown] continued to run, and other officers joined the chase. [Brown] eventually crawled beneath a [Jeep Cherokee]; the officers pulled him out and took him into custody. A .380 caliber semi-automatic firearm was found near the vehicle's right rear axle.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Brown