Commonwealth v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

145 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 147 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[the] reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo review of the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, but is simply to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the decision to issue a warrant-In so doing, the reviewing court must accord deference to the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, and must view -the information offered to establish probable cause in a common-sense, non-technical manner.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Gagliardi · Commonwealth v. Green

2. “Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclu sions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review. Before the suppression court, [Appellant] challenged the legality of the search warrant under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, arguing only that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. Thus, [Appellant’s] challenge has root in Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment each require that search warrants be supp”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 2012 Pa. Super. 21 - Commonwealth v. Hoppert

3. “The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Likewise, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution státes, “[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures .... ” Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. Under Pennsylvania law, there are three levels of encounter that aid courts in conducting search and seizure analyses. The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect-to a stop and period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 194 - Commonwealth v. Morrison