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605 S.W.2d 565

Garcia v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided July 2, 1980

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1980-07-02

Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently October 1998

2 federal appellate · 22 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“I would like an instruction on an involuntary act, that specifically being, you are instructed that a person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, omission, or possession, conduct [sic] is not rendered involuntary merely because a person did not intend the results of his conduct. Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on the occasion in question the defendant, Alfred Brown, did cause the death of Joseph Car-aballo by shooting him with a gun as alleged in the indictment, but you further believe from the evidence or have a reasonable doubt thereof that the shooting was the result of an accidental discharge of the gun and was not the voluntary act or conduct of the defendant, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict not guilty.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Brown v. State, Shugart v. State

Relies on Dockery v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1980-07-02

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1ON DENIAL OF STATE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING

DOUGLAS, Judge,

¶2dissenting.

¶3The majority denies leave to file the State’s motion for rehearing. On original submission, the panel reversed the conviction because the court did not instruct the jury to acquit if the homicide was the result of an accident. The 1925 penal code, Article 39, provided for the defense of accident. The present code has no such provision as the defense of accident. The majority relies upon the dictum in Dockery v. State, *567542 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (a 3-to-2 decision), and V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 6.01(a), which provides:

“A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission or possession, in violation of a statute that provides that the conduct is an offense.”

¶4A charge on accident is not required by the statute, but the majority ignores it.

¶5The requested charge is as follows:

“You are instructed that no act done by accident is an offense against the law. Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on the occasion in question the defendant, VICTOR RAMIREZ GARCIA, killed the deceased, Hector Jaimes, but you further believe from the evidence or have a reasonable doubt that the shooting was by the accidental discharge of a pistol in the hands of the defendant, or was the result of an accident while the deceased and the defendant were struggling or scuffling for possession of a pistol, then the defendant would not be guilty and should be acquitted. (Defendant specifically requests that should the Court include this Requested Jury Instruction, along with any of the foregoing Requested Jury Instructions, that this Requested Jury Instruction No. 13 be placed in the charge before such other charges dealing with culpable mental states so as not to appear to condition this Instruction on defendant’s not having been mentally culpable or negligent or careless.)”

¶6He did not request a charge on the lack of voluntariness. A trial judge would have to be clairvoyant to guess that a charge on lack of voluntariness would be necessary under the requested instruction. Articles 36.14 and 36.15, V.A.C.C.P., provide that an objection to a charge and a requested charge should be specific.

¶7Since accident is not a statutorily designated defense, it was not error for the trial judge to deny the requested instruction submitted.

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