Tully v. Scheu’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “. Post-conviction relief hearings are significantly different from sentence reduction hearings. At a post-conviction hearing, the defendant has the burden of proving a change in his situation that merits relief and is limited as to the grounds that may be presented to the hearing judge. To require Tully to pursue post-conviction relief would subject him to substantial burdens which he will not face at a sentence reduction hearing. In State v. Kramer, 98 N.J.Super. 539 , 237 A.2d 907, 909-10 (1967), the court explained that a ‘defendant [seeking post-conviction relief] has the burden of showing by the preponderance of the evidence that his pleas were not understanding^ or voluntarily made, and must make strict showing with solid affirmative basis for the relief sought’ (Emphasis added). See also State v. Zold, 105 N.J.Super. 194 , 251 A.2d 475, 480 (1969), aff’d, 110 N.J.Super. 33 , 264 A.2d 257 (1970). In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted the rule authorizing a change or reduction in sentence ‘to sanction reconsidered leniency,’ State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491 , 231 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 , 88 S.Ct. 572 , 19 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967), and in granting certification to suspend a custodial sentence of a defendant, the court has used as its standard for making that determination whether ‘the ends of justice will best be met’ by the suspension. State v. Tumminello, 70 N.J. 187 , 358 A.2d 769, 772 (1976). ... 607 F.2d at 36 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 487 F. Supp. 404 - Tully v. Scheu

2. ““To argue, as does the state, that Tully has no absolute right to counsel in discretionary state appeals, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 , 94 S. Ct. 2437 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974), is to mistake the real issue. The spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 3:21-10 makes absolute the right to have heard a timely reduction of sentence motion because the court is given no discretion to refuse to entertain a timely motion. See N.J.Ct.R. 3:21-10. The hearing on the motion is not an appeal but a continuation of the guilty plea-sentencing proceeding at the trial court level. It is as much a part of a trial in the context of a guilty plea reception as the original sentencing proceeding. . . . “We perceive the New Jersey sentence reduction procedure to be ‘a critical stage of the criminal proceeding.’ ” 607 F.2d at 35 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Pierce

3. ““We therefore hold that the constitutional right to counsel at the hearing during which sentence is pronounced applies with equal force and effect to the sentence reduction hearing provided under Rule 3:21-10. Once Tully began the proceeding with counsel, he had an absolute right to have counsel at his side throughout.” 607 F.2d at 35-36 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Pierce