Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 607 F.2d 779 - United States v. Blakey

United States v. Blakey’s Empirical Analysis

607 F.2d 779 · 1979

Citation profile

124
cited by 124 later decisions
11
states following
February 2020
most recently cited

76 federal appellate · 3 district · 18 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 124 later decisions — most recently February 2020 · most notably United States v. Murphy (1985), United States v. Hedman (1980)

76 federal appellate · 3 district · 18 state decisions — followed in 11 states

570197919801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Glasser v. United States · California v. Green · Stirone v. United States · Dutton v. Evans · Santoni v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 124 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.”
    10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “`[T]here is no per se rule indicating what time interval is too long under Rule 803(1). . . . [A]dmissibility of statements under hearsay exceptions depends upon the facts of the particular case.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The most plausible of defendant’s arguments is that because the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) supplied the money used in the extortionate transaction, no depletion of the payor’s assets was possible and thus the nexus with interstate commerce is not sufficient to invoke Hobbs Act jurisdiction. Defendant’s argument, however, fundamentally misreads the Act and the line of judicial interpretation it has spawned. The Hobbs Act proscribes not only the acts of obstructing or affecting interstate commerce through extortion but also proscribes “attempts ... so to do.” In short, a section 1951 violation is complete when one attempts to induce a victim engaged in interstate commerce to part with property. ... Thus, sufficient evidence to prove an attempt to extort has been found even where the payment demand was made but the victim refused to comply.... In the present case, Rindone’s offense was complete at the time he demanded payment but before the actual transfer of money. ... This court [has] found that “jurisdiction in the particular case is satisfied by showing a realistic probability that an extortionate transaction will have some effect on interstate commerce” as measured from the time of the offense. The question here then becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there is sufficient evidence that would allow a jury to find that a “realistic probability” existed at the time of the payment demand that [the extortion victim] Har”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.