607 So. 2d 347 - Mays v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[T]he resolution of this issue requires a two-step process. First, implicit in the language of § 13A-5-6(a)(5) — ‘a firearm or deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony5 — is the requirement that the underlying felony for which the defendant is convicted have, as one of its necessary elements, the element of intentional criminal conduct. Therefore, McCree’s reckless or negligent conduct, which resulted in manslaughter, while sufficient to supply the criminal scienter to support a conviction for a Class C felony, does not require a finding that he intentionally used the firearm to commit the felony, and thus can not support the application of § 13A-5-6(a)(5). In other words, reading § 13A-5-6 as a whole, we must construe subsection (a)(5) to mean that convictions for those underlying felonies that are committed without the intentional use of a deadly weapon do not fall within the category of convictions that invoke the enhancement provision of this statute. “Second, ‘enhancement,’ as that word is used to describe the effect of § 13A-5 — 6(a)(5), necessarily means that in addition to the culpability of the offense for which the defendant has been convicted, the defendant’s conduct is necessarily the result of a higher degree of culpability, because of the jury’s finding that a ‘firearm or deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony.’ Indeed, the use of a deadly weapon to commit the underlying felony is the”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Asher Bragan Bole v. State of Alabama. · 627 So. 2d 1082 - Quinlivan v. State

2. ““The degree of recklessness in the present case far surpasses that found in McCree. The commentary to § 13A-6-3, Code of Alabama 1975, defines ‘recklessly’ as follows: “ ‘[To act recklessly] means that a person [is] aware of and consciously disregardfs] “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that death will occur. “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” ’ [ (quoting § 13A-2-2(3), Code of Alabama 1975).] “Here, the appellant was aware of placing the deceased victim at the risk of death and consciously and grossly disregarded that risk. This case exemplifies the reason the Alabama Supreme Court limited McCree to its facts. McCree recognizes that there may be other situations where the enhancement provision should be used in reckless manslaughter cases. . We hold that in this case there did exist the intent envisioned by the legislature to apply the enhancement provision for the intentional use of a firearm. No error occurred here.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Williams v. State · Asher Bragan Bole v. State of Alabama.