State v. Loge

¶1(dissenting).

¶2I respectfully dissent. In its effort to reach a correct policy decision, the majority disregards our proper role as interpreters of the law. In doing so, the majority has preempted the legislature’s function and assumed the mantle of policymaker. I agree that under certain circumstances the legislature may provide that criminal liability attach without requiring any showing of intent or knowledge on the part of the person charged. See In re A.A.E., 590 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Minn.1999). Further, in the context of open containers of alcohol in motor vehicles, there is a credible argument that it is good public policy given the social and economic costs that result from the combination of alcohol and motor vehicles. But, all of that said, the majority’s analysis simply does not demonstrate the requisite clear statement of legislative intent necessary to create criminal liability in the absence of a showing of knowledge or intent.

¶3It is a fundamental principle of our substantive law, especially for statutes carrying criminal sanctions, that obligations imposed by law must be stated in clear and understandable terms. See State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. 246, 253, 21 N.W.2d 792, 795 (1946). Due process requires that a penal statute be based on “knowable criteria which [persons] of common intelligence who come in contact with the statute may use with reasonable safety in determining its command.” Id.(citing Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 34 S.Ct. 924, 58 L.Ed. 1510 (1914)). A statute is unconstitutionally vague “if it requires or forbids in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Lanesboro Produce, 221 Minn, at 254, 21 N.W.2d at 795.

¶4We have stated that when the legislature intends to make an act unlawful and to impose criminal sanctions without any requirement of intent or knowledge, it must do so clearly. See State v. Neisen, 415 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn.1987). Further, the legislature’s authority to impose criminal sanctions without any requirement of knowledge or intent is subject to another important limitation. While a person need not intend his acts to be criminal, he must intend to do the act that is criminal. We have stated that “[i]t is not essential that the wrongdoer should intend to commit the crime to which his act amounts, [but] it is essential that he should intend to do the act which constitutes the crime.” State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191, 114 N.W.2d 88, 89 (1962).1 The United States Supreme Court, confronted with a similar issue, noted:

Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.

¶5Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (citations omitted). Further, it is worth noting that in Morissettethe Court held *160that the “mere omission from [a statute] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.” Id. at 268, 72 S.Ct. 240.

¶6The majority’s analysis of the language of MinmStat. § 169.122 does not demonstrate the level of certainty necessary to allow me to conclude that the statute manifests a clear intent by the legislature to impose criminal liability regardless of intent or knowledge. The plain language of the statute, the unreasonable results that arise from the majority’s interpretation, the differing application of the statute by district courts, and even the cases cited by the majority lead me to this conclusion. Minnesota Statutes § 169.122, subd. 3, simply lacks the requisite clarity to support the imposition of criminal liability without any showing of intent or knowledge.

¶7We are guided by our accepted rules of statutory interpretation when determining the meaning of a statute. One rule, which the majority claims to follow, is to look to the plain language of the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16. The majority states that the language is plain and dispositive because the legislature frequently uses the phrase “it shall be unlawful” or “no person shall” to indicate strict liability for motor vehicle offenses. However, this is not the dispositive language in this statute. Rather, the question turns on the use of the phrase “keep or allow to be kept,”

¶8The majority attempts to avoid the implications of the phrase “allow to be kept” by discarding it on the grounds that Loge was the sole occupant of the vehicle. While we may limit the application of law to the facts presented, that does not mean that we may disregard inconvenient language contained in the statute as a whole. See Kollodge v. F & L Appliances, 248 Minn. 357, 360, 80 N.W.2d 62, 64 (1956) (stating that the court may not read statutory language out of context). The majority cannot avoid the implications of the term “allow” because it is convenient to do so. In other contexts, we have held that the inclusion of words like “permit” (a synonym of “allow”) clearly indicates a legislative intent to require some level of knowledge or intent. See, e.g., Peterson v. Pawelk, 263 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn.1978) (stating that the use of the term “permit” in a statute clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend to impose strict liability). While it is possible to find definitions of “keep” that do not appear to implicate knowledge or intent, there are, as Loge points out, many definitions of “keep” that imply some level of conscious knowledge or intent. The multiple definitions of the word “keep” cited by the parties underscore the lack of clarity in the statute’s language. None of these definitions clearly indicate that proof of knowledge or intent is either required or clearly excluded.

¶9The majority asserts that because the legislature used the similar language “keeps or allows to be kept” in MinmStat. § 152.027, but added the word “knowingly,” the lack of the word “knowingly” in Minn.Stat. § 169.122 means that no knowledge requirement was intended. While we do presume that the legislature uses words in a 'consistent manner, here such analysis yields no clear answers. It is clear that the use of the word “knowingly” in section 152.027 indicates that the legislature intended to require knowledge for the possession of marijuana in a vehicle. However, the fact that it is not included in section 169.122, a law passed some 20 years earlier and on a different subject, does not indicate that the legislature intended to disregard any requirement of knowledge or intent.

¶10The majority’s analysis also disregards those situations where there is more than one person in the vehicle. However, limiting their holding in this way does not allow the majority to artificially limit the scope of the statute and then claim that requiring knowledge in this case would make subdivision 2 of the statute surplusage. I cannot ignore the fact that the legislature intended this statute to be applied in all *161situations regardless of the number of persons in the vehicle. Viewed as such, requiring some level of intent on the part of the driver or owner would not render subdivision 2 of the statute surplusage. Also, when viewed in the situation where more than one person is in the vehicle, the majority’s interpretation of section 169.122 implies some very troubling and unreasonable outcomes.

¶11Under subdivision 2 of the statute, criminal liability is imposed for possession of an open container of alcohol by any person in a motor vehicle. See Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 2. Possession here means actual possession of or the conscious exercise of dominion or control over the container. See id. The majority claims that because this subdivision already imposes liability for the knowing possession of an open container of alcohol in a vehicle, to do so again in subdivision 3 is unnecessary. This line of reasoning only works in the majority’s interpretation and only in the case where one person is in the vehicle. When more than one person is in the vehicle, the purpose of the different subdivisions becomes clear. A passenger may have an open container of alcohol and not have disclosed that fact to the driver. Clearly subdivision 2 applies to that passenger. But it is also clear that because the passenger concealed this fact from the driver, the driver should not be held liable. To do otherwise would be to hold the driver criminally liable for an act he did not intend to commit and over which he had no control. In the case when a container is open and visible in the passenger compartment of a vehicle and none of the passengers are shown possessing it, then the owner, or driver, remains ultimately responsible. Simply because the subdivision may not have application in a unique fact pattern does not make it surplusage for the purposes of our analysis.

¶12The above example highlights one of the unreasonable results of the majority’s interpretation. A driver could be held responsible for the acts of passengers that they conceal from him. An absent owner could be held liable for acts of passengers he has never met. . In interpreting a statute, we assume that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable or absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17. •

¶13The majority also implies that in this case the bottle was in plain sight and that under the circumstance of this case, Loge actually knew (or should have known) that the open bottle was in the truck. The district court made no such finding nor is it our province to do so. The majority attempts to mollify the results of its holding by saying that in this case Loge really knew. While an interesting conclusion on the part of the majority, it renders the majority’s holding unnecessary. If Loge knew, or reasonably should have known, that this open container was present in his vehicle, the majority’s holding is unnecessary. In such a case, there is a showing of knowledge or intent sufficient to sustain Loge’s conviction without interpreting the statute as having no requirement for knowledge or intent.

¶14While the majority mentions the history of the application of this statute by district courts, it fails to consider its import. While not binding on this court, we do look to the practical construction of a statute by public officials in determining its meaning. See Governmental Research Bureau, Inc. v. St. Louis County, Minn., 258 Minn. 350, 357, 104 N.W.2d 411, 416 (1960). The district court judges of Minnesota are divided about the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3. The Minnesota District Judges Association highlighted the ambiguity of the statute when it noted in the 1989 CRIMJIG on Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3 that *16210a Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice-Jury Instruction Guides, Misdemeanor and Gross Misdemeanor, M-JIG 3.17 (1989 ed.). Later editions continued to carry the knowledge requirement as optional, leaving its inclusion to the discretion of the trial judge. See 10a Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice-Jury Instruction Guides, Misdemeanor and Gross Misdemeanor, Preface and CRIM-JIG 29.30 (4th ed.1999). Such division by the trial bench of this state indicates that the meaning of the statute’s language is much less clear than the majority contends.2 ■

*161Trial judges in Minnesota are divided as to whether or not knowledge is required under the statute, and an early Attorney General Opinion maintains that the language of the statute does not require knowledge. Op. Atty. Gen., 989a-25, Jan. 5,1960.

¶15*162The majority cites two of our earlier decisions to support the proposition that the legislature may impose criminal liability without regard to intent or knowledge. While I do not disagree with this proposition, the cited cases also demonstrate the way we have analyzed statutes when it is claimed that knowledge or intent is not required to impose criminal liability. In State v. Dombroski, we noted that the legislature clearly and unambiguously manifested its intent to impose criminal liability for the statutory rape of an incompetent female without regard to whether the accused knew that the victim was incompetent. See 145 Minn. 278, 279, 176 N.W. 985, 985-86 (1920). Here, the statute did not require knowledge that the victim was incompetent, but it required intent to commit an act that, in combination with the victim’s status, would constitute statutory rape.

¶16In In re A.A.E, we acknowledged that the legislature may make a person criminally liable for injuries resulting from the discharge of a firearm regardless of whether that person intended to cause injury, but we held that some level of intent, reckless disregard of a known danger, was required. See 590 N.W.2d at 777. While the actor need not intend to cause injury, he must intend to recklessly discharge a firearm. See id.The dispute in AA.E. was not whether intent was required, but whether a specific intent to injure another was required. See id.We observed that the language of the statute could have been read to impose liability under any circumstance where a firearm was discharged and an injury resulted; however, we noted that such an interpretation conflicted with other language in the statute and would produce unreasonable results. See id.Importantly, in both Dombroski and AA.E., there needed to be an intent to commit the act for which criminal sanctions would be imposed.

¶17The majority, limiting its analysis of this statute to the narrow facts in this case, proceeds undistracted by the implications of other contextual language in the statute and the fact that district courts of this state have differed on both the meaning and the application of the statute. While the majority claims that their holding is limited only to those situations where there is one occupant in the vehicle, they also note that this is the first time we have directly addressed the question of whether knowledge or intent is required for this statute. Given the obvious lack of clarity, the majority’s holding will likely have much wider effect.

¶18Finally, under the majority’s holding, we now will impose criminal liability on a person, not simply for an act that the person does not know is criminal, but also for an act the person does not even know he is committing. While the district court and the majority seem to assume that everyone who drives a motor vehicle knows that he or she is obligated to search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle before driving on the state’s roads, the law imposes no such requirement. Most drivers would be surprised to discover that *163after anyone else used their vehicle — children, Mends, spouse — they are criminally liable for any open containers of alcohol that are present, regardless of whether they know the containers are there. This also means that any prudent operator of a motor vehicle must also carefully check any case of packaged alcohol before transport and ensure that each container’s seal is not broken. See Minn.Stat. § 169.122 (defining an open bottle as a container that is open, has the contents partially removed, or has the seal broken). Under the majority’s interpretation, all of these situations would render the driver criminally liable under Minn.Stat. § 169.122. Without a more clear statement by the legislature that this is the law, I cannot agree with such an outcome.

¶21(dissenting).

¶22I join in the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson.