Weinman v. Graves’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “a bankruptcy trustee succeeds only to the title and rights in property that the debtor had at the time she filed the bankruptcy petition. Filing a bankruptcy petition does not expand or change a debtor’s interest in an asset; it merely changes the party who holds that interest. Further, a trustee takes the property subject to the same restrictions that existed at the commencement of the case. To the extent an interest is limited in the hands of a debtor, it is equally limited as property of the estate.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Morton v. Kievit (In Re Vallecito Gas, LLC) · Webster v. Mooney (In re Mooney)

2. “We are aware that, to a large extent, this holding conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nichols, 491 F.3d 987 . There, in a case factually indistinguishable from this one, the Ninth Circuit held that the entire refund amount was property of the estate and implicitly subject to turnover from the debtors. In doing so, however, the court focused entirely on whether the refund was property of the estate and neither discussed turnover nor analyzed the case in light of the language of § 542(a). It is therefore unclear how the Ninth Circuit would apply the statutory requirements for turnover, which clearly require possession during the case, to the present situation. We find some appeal in the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit that, by electing to have their [prior year] refund applied to [current year] taxes, the debtors in Nichols , like debtors here, received something of value, i.e., a dollar-for-dollar reduction on their [current year] taxes, money that could have been available to the bankruptcy estate had the election not been made. The fact that all or part of a tax prepayment can be estate property, however, does not determine the extent of the property interest in the hands of the trustee nor, as discussed above, does it determine whether that interest is subject to turnover.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Webster v. Mooney (In re Mooney)

3. “... we first consider the statutory language which requires that the turnover target, here debtors, be “in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under [11 U.S.C. § ]363.” 11 U.S.C. § 542 (a). We agree with the [lower court] that, after filing their chapter 7 petition and at least through the culmination of the turnover proceeding, debtors were never in “possession, custody, or control” of their contingent reversionary interest in the prepayment of their [current year] taxes.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Webster v. Mooney (In re Mooney)