Murdoch v. Castro’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]hen a state court may draw a principled distinction between the case before it and Supreme Court caselaw, the law is not clearly established for the state-court case.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Frost v. Van Boening · 769 F. Supp. 2d 1197 - SINTAY v. Martel

2. “[W]hen there is a principled reason for the state court to distinguish between the case before it and Supreme Court precedent, the state court's decision will not be an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.”). 5 . Our conclusion is also supported by the Supreme Court's opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2079 , 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009). In Montejo, the Supreme Court overruled the rule announced in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986),”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Kemp v. Ryan

3. “[W]hen a Supreme Court decision does not `squarely address[] the issue in th[e] case' or establish a legal principle that `clearly extend[s]' to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court . . ., it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is `clearly established' Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue before us, and so we must defer to the state court's decision.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 769 F. Supp. 2d 1197 - SINTAY v. Martel