Commonwealth v. Lesko’s Empirical Analysis
2011
Citation profile
99 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Jackson v. Denno · Teague v. Lane · Fay v. Noia
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 100 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A] reasonable probability that, but for counsel's lapse, the result of the ... proceeding would have been different. [ Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ]. "In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury .... Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support." Id. at 695-96 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 [ ]. Ultimately, a reviewing court must question the reliability of the proceedings and ask whether "the result of the particular proceeding [was] unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results." Id. at 696 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 [ ].”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“An explanation of the deliberately disparate treatment of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the applicable standards of proof and a clear indication that life in prison is the sentence unless the Commonwealth meets its high burden is sufficient to convey [to the jury] the fact that life is presumed.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In determining whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome has been demonstrated, the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is shown when the government’s suppression of evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that [the] materiality standard is not a sufficiency of the evidence test. A Brady violation is established by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Importantly, the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. In order to be entitled to a new trial for failure to disclose evidence affecting a witness’s credibility, the defendant must demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of his guilt or innocence.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.