Commonwealth v. Waddell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Appellant's interpretation would require that each of the Schedule I substances listed under 35 P.S. § 780-104(1) continuously meet the conditions that there be "a high potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use in the United States, and a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision." [ 35 P.S. § 780-104 ]. Apart from the fact that it is not a rational reading of the plain text, that interpretation is perceptibly untenable with respect to many of the substances listed under the statute. For instance, heroin, 18 listed as a Schedule I substance under 35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(ii)(10), is incredibly effective in the treatment of severe pain associated with heart attacks, severe physical injury, and certain terminal illnesses. 19 This is true of many of the opiates and opiate derivatives also listed under 35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(i) and (ii) as Schedule I substances. The inclusion of heroin as a Schedule I substance under Federal Law is the reason it lacks an accepted medical use in the United States. 20 18 "Heroin" is a term used for "diacetylmorphine" when that substance is used as a street drug. 19 [omitted] 20 Ultimately, our Commonwealth may criminalize the possession, manufacture, and distribution of marijuana and other intoxicating substances, independent of their medical utility, as a function of the police power, and the reasonableness of such measures is largely at the discretion of the legislature. However, the police power is not unlimited. See Commo”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Jezzi

2. “While the distribution of large quantities of marijuana is a serious offense, the instant case did not present a situation where a warrantless entry was neces sary to prevent or stop an immediate threat of violence. Police were also not in hot pursuit of a felon whose felonious conduct had been directly observed by police. Furthermore, Appellant did not flee from police into the residence in response to spotting the police, as was the case in Bostick ... and Walker . Instead, and similar to the case in Dem-shock, Appellant appeared to be unaware that the police were investigating until they arrived at his home to conduct a ‘knock and talk.’ ... [The] officers lacked any specific evidence that anyone inside the home was armed. Rather, [the] suspicion that firearms or other weapons might be found within the home was premised upon generalized experience with those that traffic in narcotics, not any particular evidence derived from the investigation in this case.... The evidence certainly surpassed the threshold necessary to establish probable cause after [the officers] detected the smell of marijuana emanating from Appellant’s house.... Once the odor of marijuana was detected emanating from the residence, the threshold necessary to establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant was met....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2013 Pa. Super. 95 - Commonwealth v. Johnson

3. “a high potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use in the United States, and a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Jezzi