Volume 61 — Connecticut Reports

Action for damages for the killing of the plaintiff’s dog; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County. The court (Perry, J!,) having overruled the plaintiff’s demurrer to a part of the defendant’s defenses, the ease was tried to the jury, who returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed on the ground of errors in the charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Suit to obtain a construction of a will; brought to .the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and reserved, upon a finding of the facts, for the advice of this court.

Shit to foreclose a mortgage; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and heard before Robinson, J. Facts found and a decree of foreclosure passed. R. W. Keeler, T. I. Raymond and W. T. Raymond, who were subsequent encumbrancers and were defendants, appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Suit for an injunction against the maintenance by the defendant of a dam at a height to which it had been raised, and for damages; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried before F. B. Hall, J. Upon the trial the principal question was whether the defendant in repairing the dam in question in 1888 raised it higher than he had the right to.- The plaintiffs in the presentation of their case offered to prove by one who had assisted in building the dam when it…

Replevin of machinery, claimed to be the property of the plaintiff, and attached by O’Brien, one of the defendants, as the property of a third person; brought to the District Court of Waterbury, and heard before Bradstreet, J. Pacts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Complaint by a prosecuting agent for the sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors by the defendant without a license from the county commissioners; brought originally before a justice of the peace and appealed by the defendant to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New London County, and tried to the jury in that court before Orump, J. Verdict “guilty,” and appeal by the defendant for error in the charge of the court and in refusing to charge as requested.

Action upon a promissory note payable to tbe plaintiff, executed in the partnership name of A. J. & J. H. Hopkins ; brought, by appeal from a justice of the peace, to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County, and heard in that court before Grump, J. The defendants were A. J. Hopkins, J. H. Hopkins and J. M. Hopkins. J. M. Hopkins alone made defense.

Action on a promissory note; brought to the City Court of the city of New Haven, and tried to the court before Pickett, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully-stated-in the opinion.

Action for the breach of a contract for service; brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County. Facts found by a committee and by the court, and the case reserved for advice. It is fully stated in the opinion.

Shit to obtain a construction of provisions in the wills of Zachariah and Thomas M. Huntington; brought to the Superior Court in New London County and reserved for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the ■opinion.

<p>A horse railroad company, whose track ran through the main street of a borough, was required by its charter to keep in repair the part of the street occupied by its track and two feet on each side; and the charter of the borough provided that, upon any street being improved, certain officials of the borough should have power to determine what “ land and buildings ” would be specially benefited by the improvement, and to assess the persons interested in such land or buildings such part as they should judge reasonable of its cost. The company neglecting to keep in repair its part of the street, the borough, in paving the street! with blocks of stone, paved about fifteen hundred feet of the space that the company was bound to repair, at a cost of $1,992. In making an assessment on the “land and buildings” specially benefited by the improvement, the city officials, and afterwards a committee appointed by the court on appeal, assessed the entire sum on the company. » Held—</p> <p>1. That the question was to be determined by the provisions of the borough charter, and not by those of the charter of the company imposing on it the duty of keeping the street in repair.</p> <p>2. That the question was simply whether the company, through the enhanced value of its “land and buildings,” received such a special benefit as to be liable to be assessed for the improvement.</p> <p>3. Whether the right of the company to lay its rails in the street and maintain them there so long as permitted by the borough, could be regarded as “land'and buildings: ” Qucere.</p> <p>4. That the franchise of the company could not be regarded as covered by that term, and that it was not enough that it was increased in value by the improvement.</p> <p>5. That the fact that the improvement had cost a certain sum could not fix that as' the amount of the assessment, if the company had property liable to the assessment, as the legal liability of the company to the borough for the money expended for it by the latter, had nothing to do with the matter.</p>

Suit by the plaintiff as administrator with the will annexed of Isaac Beers, for the construction of certain provisions in the will; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and reserved for the advice of this court. No question of general interest was involved except one with regard to the construction of Gen. Statutes, § 495, and the opinion of the court upon the rest of the case, is, by direction of the judges, omitted.

Application to set aside an assessment of property in tbe hands of the plaintiff as trustee, made by the board of relief of the defendant town; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and, upon an agreed statement of facts, reserved for the advice of this court. The ease is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>The plaintiff asked the freight cashier of a railroad company at its freight office in W what the freight rate was from there to B. The cashier, who did not know and whose duties did not require him to know, asked the way-bill clerk in the same office, but the clerk, by reason of the noise of a passing train, failed to hear the question correctly and understood him to ask the rate to M, a place not so distant, and gave him the rate as thirteen cents per hundred weight, instead of twenty-one cents, the correct rate to B. The cashier then figured up the amount and stated to the plaintiff that it would be $9.75, which the plaintiff paid and delivered the goods to the railroad company for transportation, and requested that they be forwarded immediately. The regular rate was $15.75, which was a reasonable price, and the plaintiff would have paid it if it had been stated as the price. After the plaintiff had left the clerk discovered his mistake and endeavored to find him, but he had left town, and not knowing how to communicate with him, he sent on the goods to B, with instructions to the station agent there to collect the additional $6. The mistake was fully explained to the plaintiff there, but he refused to pay it and demanded the goods, which the agent refused to deliver without the additional payment, and the plaintiff afterwards brought a suit for them. Held—</p> <p>1. That as the freight cashier passed on the plaintiff’s inquiry to the waybill clerk, who answered it as he understood it, it was the same as if the inquiry had been made directly to the clerk by the plaintiff.</p> <p>2. That, regarding the clerk as representing the company in the transaction, the minds of the parties, by reason of the mistake as to the destination of the goods, had not met upon the question of the freight-rate to be charged.</p> <p>3. That their minds not having met there was no contract. '</p> <p>4. That there having been no contract the defendant had a right to charge a reasonable price for the service rendered, and to hold the goods until it was paid.</p>

Application of the receivers of the Charter Oak Life Insurance Company for relief from a tax assessment of the funds and property in their hands ; brought to tlie Superior Court in Hartford County.

Suit for an injunction against the use by the defendant horse railroad company of overhead wires in propelling its cars by electricity, and against the granting permission so to do by the mayor and common council of the city of New Haven; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and reserved, on demurrers to the complaint, for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover a salary claimed to be due the plaintiff as chief manager of the business of the defendant corporation under a contract with the corporation; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and heard, upon the demurrer of the defendant to the plaintiff’s reply to the defendant’s special defense, before JF. B. Hall, J. Demurrer sustained and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Ineokmation in tlie police court of the city of New Lon don, charging that the defendant, “ on the 19th day of October, 1889, at the city of New London, unlawfully did receive and have in his possession, with the wrongful and unlawful intent to procure their transportation beyond the limits of this state, certain woodcock, ruffled grouse and quail, killed within this state after the first day of October, 1889.” The case was appealed by the defendant to the Criminal Court of…

Action on two promissory notes indorsed by the defendants ; brought to the Superior Court in Tolland County. The defendants resided in the state of New York, and no other service of the writ was made than by the garnishment of a debtor of the defendants residing in this state. The plaintiff was located in this state. The court, (F. B. Sail, J.,) sustained a plea to the jurisdiction and the plaintiff appealed to this court. The ease is fully stated in the opinion.

Action by the plaintiff as administratrix for the loss of life of her intestate through the negligence of the defendants; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The defendants suffered a default, and the case was' heard in damages before Fenn, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for one thousand dollars damages. Both parties appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover for ice belonging to the plaintiff and converted by the defendant; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the court before J. M. Hall, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant. The ease is fully stated in the. opinion.

Action to recover for personal property of tlie plaintiff taken by the defendant; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County, and tried to the court, upon a general denial, before Taintor, J. Judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for error in the exclusion of evidence. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

The case was referred to a committee who reported the following facts. This proceeding is based upon the lay-out of a certain highway in Hebron by the selectmen of the town, about one hundred rods in length, from an old highway leading from Hebron Green to North Pond. It runs to the low water line of the pond, and passes over an immense rock or ledge near the termination of the way.

Suit for a judicial construction of the will of Jane H. North; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and reserved, on facts agreed, for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Replevin for a horse, buggy and harness; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford County, and tried to the court, before Taintor, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>When services have been rendered in pursuance of an agreement between the parties that compensation should be made for them by will, and the party receiving them has died without making the expected compensation, the party rendering the services is entitled to compensation out of the estate of the deceased, as a creditor, for the value of the services.</p> <p>A woman who had rendered services for many years to B, upon such a promise, after his death without making a will presented to the commissioners on his estate a claim for $6,000, in twofold form, one for damages to that amount for his breach of contract, and the other for services to that amount. The commissioners allowed the claim for services, but made no disposition of the claim for damages. On an appeal taken by the heirs at law it was held that the claim for damages came up on the appeal with the others.</p> <p>On the trial evidence was offered by the claimant that JBsaid to her — “I am getting to be an old man, and you will have me to take care of. I want more to leave you, but what there is is yours.” Also that JB said to another person — “ I have an agreement with her that if she outlives me she is to have what I have.” Held admissible under the claim for services rendered, as a clear recognition of the fact that services were rendered, of their value to him, and of his obligation in some way to compensate her.</p> <p>It was no objection to the evidence that it tended to take the case out of the statute of limitations by a parol acknowledgment, nor that it tended to prove a parol agreement to leave her his estate, so long as it was not received for either of those purposes.</p> <p>Where evidence is received for no specific purpose it is not error to receive it if it is admissible for any purpose.</p>

<p>A husband and wife, desiring to make gifts of $4,000 to each of their two children, W, a son, and A, a daughter, gave to IK a farm worth that sum, and to A $1,200 in cash, and the husband made a will by which he gave her $2,800, “ to make her equal with W.” Afterwards they thought it best that a note for the $2,800, signed by them jointly and severally, should be given to A, the wife agreeing that if it was not paid by the husband in his lifetime, it should be paid out of the property given to her by his will; he, upon the faith of this agreement, making a new will giving all his property to her. The note was reduced by payments in the husband’s lifetime to $1,650, when a new note for that amount was given, signed by them both, and the old note taken up, the new note being intended as a substitute for the old. After the husband’s death the note was presented against his estate and payment refused. In a suit brought against the widow by A for equitable relief, it was held—</p> <p>1. That the property given to the wife by the will, in consideration of which she signed the original note, was a sufficient consideration for her promise.</p> <p>2. But that, independently of the question of her liability on the note, the wife took the property charged with the trust of paying whatever remained due on the note.</p> <p>3. That she was bound to pay interest on the principal sum, although the original note was not on interest, the new note, intended as a substitute for that note, providing for the payment of interest and constituting her agreement as to the debt that should be charged upon the property.</p>

<p>It is provided by Gen. Statutes, § 3828, that “ personal property in this state or elsewhere, not exempt by this title, shall for the purpose of taxation include all notes, bonds and stocks (not issued by the United States,) moneys, credits, choses in action, * * * goods, chattels or effects, or any interest therein, and such property belonging to any resident in this state shall be set in his list in the town where he resides, at its then actual valuation, except when otherwise provided.” And §3830 provides that “the list of any person need not include any property situated in another state when it can be made satisfactorily to appear to the assessors that the same is fully assessed and taxed in such other state, to the same extent as other like property owned by its citizens.” Held—</p> <p>That the stocks of corporations located in other states fall within the intent of § 3828, and are taxable here when owned by residents of this state.</p> <p>2. And that it makes no difference whether the corporations are public or private ones.</p> <p>3. But that under § 3830 such foreign corporations are presumed to be taxed in the state where they ai’e located, and that it is the duty of the assessors to ascertain that they are not so taxed, and not of the taxpayer to prove that they are.</p> <p>The American Express Company and the United States Express Company are associations in the nature of partnerships, the capital stock of which is divided into shares, -which are transferable like those of a corporation. Held that, for purposes of taxation, the shares were clearly personal property within the statute, and the court inclined to the opinion that they should be treated as if they were shares of stock in a private corporation.</p> <p>Double taxation by construction is to be avoided, unless the law plainly and imperatively requires such construction.</p>

Action for an injury to the plaintiff through the negligence of the defendant; brought to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried to the court, on a general denial, before Robinson, J. Facts found and judgment for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action against an unincorporated association by one of its members; brought to the Superior-Court in Fairfield County. Demurrer by defendant. Heard before Thayer, J. Complaint held insufficient and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by plaintiff. The ease is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>Application for relief from an assessment for taxation by the defendant town; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court before Thayer, J, Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs. The case is fully stated in the opinion.</p>

Suit for a divorce ; brought to the Superior Court iu Fair-field County, and heard before Phelps, J. Facts found and divorce granted, and appeal by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>The statute with regard to the filing of judgment liens contains (Gen. Statutes, § 3034,) the following provision : — “Nothingin the three preceding sections contained shall be construed to authorize any such lien to hold and be valid as to any real estate which might not have been levied upon under an execution on the same judgment at the date of filing such lien.” Held not to affect a lien filed, that, at the time of filing it, there was a stay of execution on the judgment.</p>

Action to recover the amount of two policies of life insurance ; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. On motion of the defendant, Hannah Masters was cited in as a co-defendant, to interplead with the plaintiff as to the right to the money in question, and the case was made one of interpleader between the plaintiff and the said Hannah.

Suit for an injunction against the institution and maintenance of an action at law and for other equitable relief; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and reserved, upon facts found, for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Habeas CORPUS; brought to the Superior Court in Fair-field County, and reserved, on a finding of facts, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action on a replevin bond; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. A demurrer to the defendants’ answer having been sustained, as also a demurrer to his supplemental answer, the defendant suffered a default and the case was heard in damages before Prentice, J. Facts found and damages assessed at 1778.52, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

, Information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. Held: and the said convention did proceed to choose by ballot a person to fill the office of governor of the state of Connecticut from a list of two persons found to have the greatest number of votes for the office of governor at the electors’ meetings held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, 1888, with the result that…

A motion to erase the appeal from the docket for want of jurisdiction was denied by the court, (J. M. Hall, J.,) and the case heard on its merits and judgment rendered for the appellant. Appeal by the appellees. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover possession of real estate and for rents and profits; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the court before J. M. Sail, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Petition to the county commissioners of Litchfield County for an order for the repair of a certain highway of the defendant town; order made, and appeal from it by the town to the Superior Court in Litchfield County. Heard before Robinson, J., and order disaffirmed and appeal by the petitioners. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>In a suit for the reformation of a warranty deed, so as to make it include a strip of land, from which the plaintiff had been evicted, covered by the original contract but by mistake not covered by the terms of the deed, and for damages for the breach of the covenants of the deed by reason of the eviction, the court below made a finding of the facts and rendered judgment for the defendant. On appeal by the plaintiff this court held the judgment to he erroneous upon the facts, and granted a new trial “ at which the Court of Common Pleas may reform the deed, and thereupon render judgment for damages for the breach of the covenants now in said deed contained.” Held that the court did not intend to grant, and did not grant, a new trial as to the facts.</p> <p>The case was however, against the objection of the plaintiff, retired upon the facts, and the defendant appealed from the judgment on the ground that the court had erred in its rulings on the new trial. Held that, as the new trial on the facts should not have been had, the errors were of no consequence.</p> <p>This court could consider only the facts as found on the first trial.</p> <p>The plaintiff had been evicted from the strip of land in question and at the trial of the case had cited in the present defendant to defend the title. In the present suit the court allowed him as damages, not only the value of the land from which he had been evicted, but the expense which he had necessarily incurred in his defense against the ejectment suit. Held to be error.</p> <p>It has been our immemorial usage in actions brought to recover damages for a breach of the covenant of warranty, where the warrantor comes in to defend or is cited in, to give the plaintiff the value of the land at the time of the eviction, with the cost which he has sustained in the action by which he was evicted.</p> <p>But in this case the deed did not include the strip to which the action of ejectment pertained, and its covenants had no application to it; so that the defendant, although cited in, could not be regarded as a warrantor, with the duty of assuming the defense resting upon him.</p> <p>The court below, in reforming the deed, had decreed that the rights of the parties should be “ the same as if the added clause had been a part of the deed at the time of its delivery.” Held that it was proper that the reformed deed should take effect by relation as of its original delivery so far as the land was concerned, but that the court could not give it such a relation back as to have it create an obligation of the present defendant to have at that time assumed the defense.</p>

<p>It is provided by Gren. Statutes, § 333, that the reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Errors, “ shall, when prepared by the reporter of judicial decisions and ready for publication, be published under the supervision of the comptroller, who shall cause the several volumes to be stereotyped and to be copyrighted in the name of the secretary for the benefit of the people of the state.” Another statute provided for the reporter’s salary and fixed the price to be paid him for copies of opinions called for. Upon an application for a mandamus to compel the reporter to furnish, upon a tender of the fee allowed, copies of all opinions for publication in a weekly magazine in advance of their official publication, or to .be allowed to make copies for the purpose, it was held that, independently of all questions of copyright, the state had the right to direct as to the publication of the reports, and having directed that they should be published under the supervision of the comptroller when ready for publication, the applicant had no right to copies for earlier publication.</p>

The court (Thayer, J.,) reversed the probate decree and the appellees appealed to this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

A rule to show cause was issued; the parties appeared and the defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, to which the plaintiffs demurred.

Cowles, deceased; taken to the Superior Court in Hartford. County. The court (.Robinson, J.,') made a finding of the facts and reversed the decree. of the probate court, and the original' appellees appealed to this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action for damages to a house and lot of the principal plaintiff by the act of the defendant railroad company in raising the grade of a street; brought to the District Court of Waterbury. The defendants filed a special answer, to which the plaintiffs replied, and the defendants demurred to the reply. The court (Bradstreet, J.,) sustained the demurrer, and rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed. The case is fully staked in the opinion.

Action to recover a royalty claimed to be due to the plaintiffs under a contract with the defendants upon certain patented articles made by the latter; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried to the court before Thayer, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Sturdevant as administrator with the will annexed of Olivia A. Sturdevant, the appellant being the residuary legatee under the will; taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and heard before Fenn, J. The court made the following finding of facts.

Suit for an injunction against the use of certain premises for the sale of liquors; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and heard before Robinson, J. Facts found and a permanent injunction granted, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover upon an account; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County. The defendants pleaded a set-off and counter-claim, and the whole question in the case arose thereon. The case was tried to the court before Perry, J'., the facts found, and judgment rendered for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>An appeal to this court on the ground of errors in the trial and conviction of the appellant in a criminal prosecution in a lower court, is not itself, in any proper sense, a criminal proceeding.</p> <p>Therefore a bond for costs given on the appeal by the appellant’s attorney in the case is not invalidated by the statute (Gen. Statutes, § 1614), which provides that “ no attorney-at-law shall be permitted to become recognized or give any bond in any criminal action or proceeding in which he shall be interested as attorney.”</p>

Action for recovery of possession of land, with rents and profits; brought to the District Court of Waterbury. The original plaintiffs were John Erwin and wife ; during the pendency of the suit Cephalia P. Larkin was admitted as a plaintiff, and, she dying before the trial, John Erwin entered as administrator of her estate, and, with his wife, withdrew individually from the case; so that, at the time of the trial the only plaintiff was John Erwin as administrator.

Suit for an injunction against the flooding of the plaintiff’s land by setting back the water of a stream upon it; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. The case was heard before Denting, J., who made the following finding of facts.

, (of the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County,) and referred to a committee, who made a report, against the acceptance of which the defendant borough remonstrated. The case was reserved, upon the remonstrance, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Actioh to recover the value of a mare and colt injured while being transported by the defendant railroad company; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County.

Mandamus ; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The application was made by the state’s attorney for the county, and averred as follows:— 1. That Nicholas Staub was duly elected comptroller at the general election held in November, 1890, and duly qualified and entered upon the duties of that office, and is now and for more than one year last past has been comptroller. 2.

<p>In mandamus the alternative writ stands in tbe place of the complaint in ordinary civil actions. A motion to quash it performs the office of a general demurrer, while a return stands in the place of an answer. To each the general principles and rules of pleading and practice apply so far as they are applicable to the subject matter.</p> <p>In an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant, the comptroller of public accounts, to pay the plaintiff a sum claimed by him to be due as his salary as executive secretary, the plaintiff averred in the alternative writ that B was governor of the state and had appointed him as his secretary. The defendant’s return alleged that B was not governor of the state, but that Mhad received at the election a majority of all the votes cast for governor, and did not appoint the plaintiff, but another person as his secretary. Held that the issue so presented, as to the election of M as governor, was immaterial, as it was between persons not parties to the record, and was impertinent in that its decision would not dispose of the case, and that such pleading might properly be expunged.</p> <p>The defendant filed a motion that the alternative writhe quashed. In his return he had admitted the fact the want of an averment of which was the ground of his motion to quash. Held that he could not move to quash while leaving that admission upon the record.</p> <p>When a party desires to plead out of the order which the law or the practice prescribes, he should move the court for leave to do so. Such a motion is addressed to the discretion of the court and the granting or refusing it is not the subject of error.</p> <p>A party cannot plead to the merits and demur at the same time, or at different times where both are pending at the same time.</p> <p>The court allowed an amendment of the alternative writ, but denied the defendant’s motion for further opportunity to plead. But the amendment presented no new issue. It did not change the form of the action nor the ground on which relief was claimed, and the fact that the amendment averred had been expressly admitted by the defendant’s answer. The court had also found the fact on evidence and the defendant’s counsel had declined to offer any evidence on the point, though given the opportunity. Held that the court properly declined to receive further pleading.</p>

Shit for the foreclosure of a builders’ lien; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and heard before J. M. Hall, J. A large number of mortgagees and lienors were made parties defendant, and filed answers setting up their claims upon the property. The court found the facts and granted the plaintiffs and other lienors a decree of foreclosure, and two mortgagees, and the trustee in insolvency of the defendant Woodruff, appealed.

Action to recover for supplies furnished to’ a pauper; .rought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County, l-nd tried to the court before Taintor, J. Facts found and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>The act of 1889, (Acts of 1889, ch. 22, sec. 11,) provides that in actions at law “ the plaintiff at any time after the entry of the action, and the defendant at any time after the answer, may file a motion praying for a disclosure of facts or production of papers, books or documents material to the support or defense of the suit, within the knowledge, possession or power of the1 adverse party. Held that the statute applies only where the matter as to which the disclosure is sought pertains to the case of the party seeking it, and lies within the exclusive knowledge or possession of the adverse party.</p> <p>The statute was not designed to enlarge the scope of an equitable principle, but simply to enable a court of law, in administering legal remedies, to exercise a clearly defined power of a court of equity.</p>