Felton v. Ackerman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “_ “In the present case, however, we are of the opinion that the principle relied on cannot aid the appellant. He is the receiver of the federal court, and, while it is true that this is an adversary proceeding, as already stated, he does not lose his character as an officer of the court, with all the consequences as to directness of remedy against him which this relation makes necessary. Section 2 of the act of August 13, 1888, defining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, provides that whenever in any cause pending in any court of the United States, there shall be a receiver or manager in possession of any property, such receiver or manager shall manage and operate such properly according to the requirements of the valid laws of the state in which such property shall be situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof; and then follows a provision for punishment of any receiver who shall violate the foregoing requirement. If Ackerman, by his petition and his proofs, shows that the receiver has been guilty of a public nuisance in erecting a fence across the highway, in the administration of the trust, it is the duty of the court to make an order enjoining him from doing so, even though in an independent action Ackerman as an individual may not be able to obtain relief. It is of the greatest importance that receivers of the federal courts shall not be violators of the state laws; and, whereve”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Chattanooga Terminal Ry. Co. v. Felton

2. ““While it is true that the receiver is an arm of the court in the administration of the property, yet where persons intervene to obtain relief against him, because they cannot obtain full relief in any other forum, the issue raised by his answer to the petition makes the proceeding an adversary one, in which the receiver represents the interests of the owners of the property of which he is temporarily in charge. If, as such representative, he feels aggrieved by an order of the court made in an adversary proceeding of this character, it is diflicuLt to see why he should not be permitted to have the order of the court reviewed by the appellate tribunal to which any other litigant may resort. Certainly, the owners of the property, if aggrieved by the order against the receiver, might appeal, and (here would scam to be no justice in preventing the temporary custodian of their property from doing so. * * * But where the appeal is in the interest of the property, and therefore is in the interest of all who shall thereafter be shown to have any right to the property, it is quite convenient and proper that the receiver should be allowed to conduct the appellate proceeding. * * * He is the receiver of the federal court; and, while it is true that this is an adversary proceeding, as already stated, he does not lose his character as an officer of the court, with all the consequences as to directness of remedy against him which this relation makes necessary. Section 2 of the act of Augus”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Goodman Mfg. Co. v. Pittsburg-Buffalo Co.

3. ““it is of tlie greatest importance that receivers of the federal courts shall not be violators of the state laws; and wherever a court is made to know, in any proper way, that its receiver is violating the law of the state in which is the property of which he has charge, the court must, sua sponte, direct him to cease further violation.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati Inclined Plane Ry. Co.