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← 61 F.3d 810 - Osborne v. Babbitt

Osborne v. Babbitt’s Empirical Analysis

61 F.3d 810 · 1995

Citation profile

19
cited by 19 later decisions
1
states following
February 2010
most recently cited

12 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently February 2010

12 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

130199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 25 U.S.C. § 348 · 25 U.S.C. § 371 · 25 U.S.C. § 372 · 5 U.S.C. § 706

Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. · United States National Bank v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. · Negonsott v. Samuels · Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers, we first determine whether the statute is unambiguous. If the intent of Congress is clear then we must give effect to that intent. The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If, however, the statute is ambiguous or silent on the issue in question, we must determine whether the agency’s determination is based on a permissible construction of the statute. If so, we will defer to the agency’s interpretation. In determining the meaning of a statute, we look at not only the statute itself but also at the larger statutory context. We may ascertain the intent of Congress through statutory language and legislative history.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “used or possessed” in connection with another felony offense. Bailey dealt strictly with “use” of a firearm. Thus, adopting Defendant’s argument would render the guidelines' insertion of the words "or possessed” meaningless. "We will not construe a statute in a way that renders words or phrases meaningless, redundant, or superfluous.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.