State v. Brighter’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), the presence of a dangerous drug, harmful drug, or detrimental drug in a motor vehicle, other than a public omnibus, is prima facie evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person in the vehicle at the time the drug was found.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rivas v. United States · State v. Bumanglag

2. “the giving of State’s Requested Instruction No. 4 ... served to shift the burden of proof to [Brighter], The instruction charged that proof of the underlying facts “is sufficient to prove the fact” of knowing possession, provided that no contrary evidence amounting to a reasonable doubt “is introduced.” Although the instruction faithfully tracked the language of HRS § 701-117 ..., we are not fully convinced that the jurors could not have been misled into thinking that they were required to find the element of knowing possession in the absence of defense evidence amounting to a reasonable doubt. In view of our holding that only permissive inferences may arise under HRS § 701-117 ..., State v. Dwyer, supra, the jury should have been given a clarifying instruction to the effect that it could—but was not required to— find the element of knowing possession upon proof of the underlying facts. Accordingly we hold the giving of State’s Requested Instruction No. 4 without such a clarifying instruction so infected the entire trial that [Brighter’s] resulting conviction does not comport with due process.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Pone

3. “[Tjhe giving of [the State’s instruction] ... served to shift the burden of proof to appellant. The instruction charged that proof of the underlying facts “is sufficient to prove the fact” of knowing possession, provided that no contrary evidence amounting to a reasonable doubt “is introduced.” Although the instruction faithfully tracked the language of [the statute], we are not fully convinced that the jurors could not have been misled into thinking that they were required to find the element of knowing possession in the absence of defense evidence amounting to a reasonable doubt. In view of our holding that only permissive inferences may arise under [the statute], the jury should have been given a clarifying instruction to the effect that it could but was not required to find the element of knowing possession upon proof of the underlying facts.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Mitchell