¶1dissenting:
¶2The evidence on property rights was introduced some three weeks prior to the effective date of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 101 etseq.). Subsequent to such effective date, the trial court made its findings which were incorporated in a decree purporting to dispose of the property under the provisions of the subsequently effective statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 503). Such decree found and purported to dispose of all property as marital property.
¶3Section 503(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 503(c)) includes as criteria for the disposition of marital property:
“It also shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors, including:
(1) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit:
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; … (Emphasis added.)
¶4At the time of the trial these criteria were not operative and evidence of value was not introduced. In effect there was some division in kind of personal property. At the time of the hearing, realty in joint tenancy would be left in that tenancy between the parties unless there was a showing of special equities, a conveyance was ordered in lieu of alimony, or partition was prayed and ordered. The trial court made no finding as to any of such dispositions but treated the joint estate as marital property. That treatment was necessarily made without any regard for the statutory criteria quoted.
¶5The principal opinion appears to affirm upon an hypothesis that:
“If there was any error in the court’s determination that the real estate was all marital property, defendant was not injured because the nonmarital property would have been awarded to plaintiff as a matter of law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 503(c)).”
¶6The record does not clearly show that the joint estate was of nonmarital property as a matter of law. Upon the apparent facts the opposite conclusion is necessary for the joint tenancy was created subsequent to the marriage and the husband made some undetermined contribution toward the purchase of the property.
¶7Since the trial court clearly did not follow the terms of the statute under which he undertook to dispose of the joint estate, I would conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to reopen for hearing evidence required under the statute. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.