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← 61 Md. App. 169 - Lee v. State

61 Md. App. 169 - Lee v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1985

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
1
states following
August 2020
most recently cited

15 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently August 2020

15 state decisions

8019851990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Barker v. Wingo · United States v. Marion · United States v. MacDonald · Texas v. Louisiana · General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. (Footnote omitted)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “there the second indictment served to commence the critical time period because of the government’s exercise involving good faith. In these cases the government did not deliberately attempt to circumvent the mandate of the Sixth Amendment by dismissing the charges. Instead, a sound prosecutorial decision was made---- “Good faith” in this context presupposes the diligence apparent in MacDonald in bringing a case to trial; there, after the dismissal of the military charges, the civilian ones were not brought until a much more extensive investigation was completed. See also State Farm Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 332-33 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967) (good faith in the context of an insurance policy means “being faithful ... to the duty or obligation owed”; negligence is relevant in determining whether one acted in good faith).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “the formerly accused is, at most, in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation. Certainly the knowledge of an ongoing criminal investigation will cause stress, discomfort, and perhaps a certain disruption in normal life.... But with no charges outstanding, personal liberty is certainly not impaired to the same degree as it is after arrest while charges are pending.... Following dismissal of charges, any restraint on liberty, disruption of employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public obloquy, stress and anxiety is no greater than it is upon anyone openly subject to a criminal investigation.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.