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61 N.C. 353

Hicks v. . Critcher

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided June 5, 1867

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1867-06-05

Assumpsit, begun by warrant and tried at Spring Term, 1867, of tbe Superior Court of Granville, before Warren, J. Tbe plaintiff testified that one Barnett, a son-in-law of tbe -defendant, owed bim $24, due by bond given in 1859; that in tbe same year, Barnett being about to leave tbe State and tbe plaintiff about to sue out a warrant on bis debt, tbe defendant said to bim, “Doctor, don’t warrant Barnett; be bas put property in my bands to pay bis debts, and when I sell it I…

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently August 1955

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1867-06-05

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Pearson, C. J.

¶1 We do not concur with his Honor in the-view taken of the case.

¶2*355 He left it to the jury to say “ whether the defendant had funds in his hands belonging to Barnett.” By this we are to understand property as distinguished from money; for there was no evidence that he had money in hand. On the contrary, the defendant, being made a witness by the plaintiff, swears that all of Barnett’s property was sold by one Howard, to whom Barnett had made a deed of trust.

¶3 To entitle the plaintiff to recover it was necessary to show that the defendant had money of Barnett’s in his hands. The promise is to pay “ when I sell the property.”

¶4 Draughan v. Bunting, 9 Ire., 10, turns on the fact that Bunting had the cash in hand; and so in Stanly v. Hendricks, 13 Ire., 85, it is assumed that the defendant had made sale and realized' the price.

¶5 It is familiar learning' that, to maintain the action for money “ had and received,” or for money “ paid,” the defendant must have the money; indeed the very name given to these actions show that it must be so. See Page v. Einstein, 7 Jon., 147. The suggestion that the defendant either had sold the property, or was guilty of gross laches in not selling in so long a time, cannot avail the plaintiff in this action, which Avas commenced before a single justice of the peace. Whether it would support an action of another kind is not now presented.

¶6 We also think his Honor erred in intimating an opinion as to a matter of fact in regard to reconciling the testimony.

¶7 Per Curiam. Venire de novo.

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