State v. Poteet’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 23 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““But when the defendant has already been convicted an admission of guilt is of doubtful value. We do not say the sentencing judge may not find otherwise in a given case.. .. Generally, however, a confession at that point is of little rehabilitative significance. In any event, the sentencing judge should not himself seek to induce a defendant to confess. The danger of misunderstanding and of unintended coercion is too great. * * * A confession at that juncture is worth too little to compensate for the risk that the defendant who does not yield will believe he was punished additionally because he did not. “Hence we would disapprove a practice of calling routinely upon defendants at sentencing to disavow their stance of innocence.” 295 A. 2d 859 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 21 Md. App. 214 - Johnson v. State · 201 N.J. Super. 514 - State v. Marks

2. “The controlling principles are easily stated although not as easily applied. Surely punishment may not exceed what the man and his offense would warrant merely because he went to trial. A defendant has a right to defend, and although he is not privileged to commit perjury in that defense, the sentencing judge may not add a penalty because he believes the defendant lied. One reason is evident. A man may not be punished except upon a charge and opportunity for hearing. There having been no charge of perjury or conviction for that crime, due process would be denied if further punishment were inflicted for that crime. Another reason, apart from this procedural obstacle, is that the right to defend would be unduly burdened if a defendant understood that, if convicted, his mere denial of the charge under oath would without more lead to successive convictions for perjury until he or the State was exhausted. We need not say whether a defendant may ever be indicted when he does no more than falsely deny his guilt at trial; we here refer to the values embarrassed by a perjury prosecution in order to stress the wrongfulness of including in a sentence something extra upon a belief that the defendant lied in asserting his innocence. Upon the proposition that no further penalty may thus be exacted, the cases agree. See Scott v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 377 , 419 F.2d 264 (1969); Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5 Cir. 1966); Miler v. United States, 255 A.2d 497 (D.C.Ct.App.196”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Poteet v. Fauver

3. “When they appeared for sentencing each was entitled to judicious disposition in the particular light of his presentence report (cf. State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128 , 259 A.2d 895 (1969)) without additional penalty or jeopardy to his right of appeal because of his denial of guilt. ... As the court put it in Miler: A trial judge may not penalize a defendant for not admitting guilt and expressing remorse once the jury has found him guilty. Such an admission might jeopardize his right of appeal or a motion for a new trial. Nor is it proper for the trial judge to impose a heavier sentence because he believes the defendant perjured himself in maintaining his innocence on the stand, or because he exercised his right of a jury trial. 255 A.2d at 498 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Poteet v. Fauver