Tuso v. Markey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ 'In the ordinary case res ipsa loquitur merely permits the jury'to-choose the inference of the defendant’s negligence ip preference to other permissible inferenees. It-avoids a nonsuit and gets the plaintiff to the jury; but a verdict for the defendant' will be affirmed even'though he offers no evidence.’ ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McFall Ex Rel. McFall v. Shelley · Pack v. Read

2. “You may, however, find that there arises an inference that the proximate cause of the occurrence or accident was some negligent conduct on the part of defendant, if you find from the evidence the following things: * * * * * "I instruct you that if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the `accident' complained of did occur and will not occur ordinarily when a surgeon has used the ordinary and standard degree of skill and care * * * and you further find that the defendant was in exclusive control and without any voluntary action or contribution of the plaintiff, and that the injury was caused by some instrumentality within the control of defendant, then I instruct you are entitled to find an inference of negligence chargable [sic] to the defendant. * * * * * "* * * By giving the instruction it means only that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence which, if believed by you, would justify reasonable minds to infer that `some' negligent act caused the injury or injuries during the surgery.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dacus v. Miller

3. ““Of course had appellant, by proof of specific acts of negligence, established all the facts as to how the accident happened, thereby dispelling any inference drawn by force of the rule, the doctrine would not be available to her, notwithstanding such general allegations of negligence. In such circumstances, she would be limited solely to inferences, if any, which might arise from proof of specific acts. * * * ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Harless v. Ewing