State v. Bauer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 69 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “{¶ 49} “There is no justification for a rule which could require a court to reschedule, within a few days after his rearrest, the trial of a defendant who has forfeited his appearance bond. Such a holding would not comport with the realities of congested court dockets which are typically set months in advance. {¶ 50} “ * * * {¶ 51} “It is our conclusion that a defendant who fails to appear at a scheduled trial, and whose trial must therefore be rescheduled for a later date, waives his right to assert the provisions of R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 for that period of time which elapses from his initial arrest to the date he is subsequently rearrested.””

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Duncan · State v. Hamlet, Unpublished Decision (6-22-2005)

2. “{¶ 36} “The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following: {¶ 37} “(A) Any period during which the accused is unavailable for hearing or trial, by reason of other criminal proceedings against him, within or outside the state, by reason of his confinement in another state, or by reason of the pendency of extradition proceedings, provided that the prosecution exercises reasonable diligence to secure his availability; {¶ 38} “(B) Any period during which the accused is mentally incompetent to stand trial or during which his mental competence to stand trial is being determined, or any period during which the accused is physically incapable of standing trial; {¶ 39} “(C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused’s lack of counsel, provided that such delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in providing counsel to an indigent accused upon his request as required by law; {¶ 40} “(D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the accused; {¶ 41} “(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused; {¶ 42} “(F) Any period of delay necessitated by a removal or change of venue pursuant to law; {¶ 43} “(G) Any period during which trial is stayed pursuant to an express statutory requirement, or pursuant to an order of another court competent to issue such orde”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. City of Dublin v. O'brien, 07ap-695 (3-13-2008) · State v. Larkin, Unpublished Decision (6-21-2005)

3. “the proper focus of a court in circumstances such as these is upon the underlying source of the delay.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Duncan · State v. Larkin, Unpublished Decision (6-21-2005)