State v. Bonnell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

87 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 91 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In his twentieth proposition of law, appellant claims that it was “per se ” constitutional error to arraign him on capital charges in the absence of his appointed counsel. Appellant relies primarily on Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 , 82 S.Ct. 157 , 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961). We find that appellant’s reliance on Hamilton is misplaced. Hamilton stands for the proposition that prejudice can be presumed from the absence of counsel at an arraignment on capital charges. However, the decision in Hamilton was based upon the crucial nature of arraignment under Alabama law. In Dean [v. Maxwell], 174 Ohio St. 193 , 187 N.E.2d 884 [ (1963)], this court explained the difference between Alabama law and Ohio law and rejected a contention similar to the one set forth by appellant herein. Based upon our holding in Dean, appellant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the absence of counsel at the arraignment. In an attempt to show prejudice, appellant claims that the requirements of former Crim.R. 10(A) and (C) 18 were not properly followed at his arraignment. Upon review of the record, we find that appellant suffered no prejudice in this regard. At his arraignment, appellant pled not guilty, made no incriminating statements, and lost no crucial rights. Accordingly, we reject appellant’s twentieth proposition of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 301 F. Supp. 2d 698 - Bonnell v. Mitchel

2. “Appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial upon receiving the note from Marsh. Appellant contends that the alleged error was prejudicial since, according to appellant, Marsh violated her oath as a juror in order to quickly end the deliberations and, thus, her service as a juror. The record before us does not support appellant’s claim that Marsh or any other juror acted improperly during deliberations. The jury was instructed regarding its duties and responsibilities in the penalty phase and we must assume that the jury performed its obligations as instructed. Every member of the jury was polled and each member stated that the recommendation of death was his or her individual recommendation. We are satisfied that appellant was not prejudiced by the claimed error and, therefore, we reject appellant’s third proposition of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 301 F. Supp. 2d 698 - Bonnell v. Mitchel

3. “Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that appellant must be found to be the principal offender of the aggravated murder offense in order for appellant to be found guilty of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) death penalty specification. Additionally, appellant argues that because the verdict forms do not indicate that the jury found appellant to be the principal offender, the state failed to prove an essential element of its case. We find no reversible error. The evidence in this case does not reasonably suggest that Bunner’s murder was committed by more than one offender. Thus, appellant was either the principal offender, or he committed no offense at all. We conclude that, under these circumstances, any error in failing to instruct the jury on the principal offender issue was not outcome determinative.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 301 F. Supp. 2d 698 - Bonnell v. Mitchel