James v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““James argues that according to Lucas v. State, 597 So.2d 759 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), the circuit court erred because it failed to set out its reasons for denying the in forma pauperis request. He also cites Rule 24(a), Ala. R.App. P., in support of his argument that it was error for the circuit court not to make specific findings of fact when denying his request for indigency status. “In Lucas this Court stated: ‘[T]he circuit court may require the payment of that docket fee if the petitioner is not in fact indigent and the finding of the circuit court to that effect is made a part of the record.’ 597 So.2d at 760 . We did not hold that findings are mandatory or even necessary when denying a request for indigency status. Also, our decision in Lucas was modified by our subsequent decision in Goldsmith v. State, 709 So.2d 1852 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). In Goldsmith , we held that a petition for a writ of mandamus — rather than appeal — is the proper method of seeking review of a ruling of a request to proceed in forma pauperis. “Also, Rule 24(a), Ala. RApp. P., states: “ ‘Leave to Proceed In Forma Pau-peris From Trial Court to Appellate Court. A party to an action in a court who desires to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis shall file in the trial court a motion for leave so to proceed, together with an affidavit showing, in the detail prescribed by Form 15 of the Appendix of Forms, the party’s inability to pay fees and costs or to give security therefor, the party’s belief that he o”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Wyre, Jr., Cr-10-0773 (ala.crim.app. 5-27-2011)

2. ““ ‘Postconvietion relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-424 , 83 S.Ct. 822, 841 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963). It is a collateral attack that normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief....’ “Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). “ ‘[P]ostconvietion state collateral review itself is not a constitutional right, even in capital cases. Murray v. Giarratano (1989), 492 U.S. 1 , 109 S.Ct. 2765 , 106 L.Ed.2d 1 ; Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987), 481 U.S. 551 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 . A post-conviction proceeding is not an appeal phase, died in 2002. (R. 29.) of a criminal conviction, but, rather, a collateral civil attack on the judgment. See State v. Crowder (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 151 , 573 N.E.2d 652 . Postcon-viction review is a narrow remedy, since res judicata bars any claim that was or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.’ “State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410 , 639 N.E.2d 67, 76 (1994).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 99 So. 3d 349 - Miller v. State

3. ““Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the. conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Yeomans v. State