Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 61 TEX 345 - Jones v. George

Jones v. George’s Empirical Analysis

1884

Citation profile

94
cited by 94 later decisions
13
states following
October 2016
most recently cited

94 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 94 later decisions — most recently October 2016 · most notably Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc. (1981), Miller v. Germain Seed & Plant Co. (1924)

94 state decisions — followed in 13 states

29018841890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 94 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““It is not pretended, that the seller warranted the article sold to he such a substance as would accomplish the purpose desired by the buyer; but it is certainly true that he sold and delivered it as and for ‘paris green,’ that it was for this the parties mutually contracted, and that the delivery of something else was not a compliance with the contract, it not being shown that the purchaser bought the substance delivered, taking upon himself not only the risk of quality, which is the matter to which warranty applies, but also of kind. It is evident that the buyer relied on and trusted.- the representation of the seller. If the article delivered had been ‘paris green,’ but of an inferior quality, then the question would arise, the seller knowing for what purpose it was bought, whether there was an implied warranty in the sale of such an article, for such a known purpose, that the article delivered should be of a’ quality necessary to accomplish the purpose which a good quality of ‘paris green’ would accomplish in the matter in which the buyer intended to use it. That, however, is not this case. The appellant contracted to buy, and the appellee contracted to sell and deliver, ‘paris green,’ and not some other substance; hut ‘chrome green,’ a substance not having the properties of ‘paris green,’ though resembling it in appearance, was delivered. In such cases, technically, no warranty arises, but there is an implied contract that the thing sold and delivered is of the kind whic”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““This rule has been applied substantially in many cases by the courts of America, and in the case of Calvit v. McFadden, 13 Tex. 326 , the spirit of the rule was thus announced by Wheeler, J.: ‘The difficulty, if not impossibility, of laying down any precise and definite rule of general application in respect to what may be recovered as consequential damages, is shown by Mr. Sedgwick in his review of the cases upon this subject in his treatise on the Measure of Damages. He quotes the language of the Supreme Court of Louisiana that “the damages which a party may recover on the breach of a contract are those which are incidental to and caused by the breach, and may reasonably be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract” ( 13 La. 404 ); and this, he concludes, is the clearest and most definite line that can be drawn in respect to such damages. * * * And to apply the rule of the Louisiana court, which seems free from objection, it must'have appeared also that the loss was incidental to and caused hv the breach, of the contract, and was such as may reasonably be supposed to have entered into the •contemplation of the parties contracting-.’ In •the last edition of Hr. Sedgwick’s work on the Heasure of Damages, 104, 122, he adopts the rule thus stated by the Douisiana court as ‘perhaps the clearest and most definite rule that can be framed in this perplexing matter.’ The rule in Louisiana seems to be established by the ■Code of that ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““We think the proper rule in-such a case as the present is this: Where two parties have made a contract, which one of them has broken, the damages which the other ought to receive, in respect to such breach of contract, should be either such as may fairly and substantially be considered as arising naturally— i. e., according to the usual course of things— from such a breach of contract-itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.