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← 61 U.S. 343 - Timothy Goodman v. John Simonds

Timothy Goodman v. John Simonds’s Empirical Analysis

61 U.S. 343 · 1857

Citation profile

241
cited by 241 later decisions
24
cited 24 times by the Supreme Court
28
states following
October 2019
most recently cited

81 federal appellate · 10 district · 90 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 241 later decisions (24 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2019 · most notably Galloway v. United States (1943), Inhabitants of the Township of Montclair County of Essex v. Ramsdell (1882)

81 federal appellate · 10 district · 90 state decisions — followed in 28 states

36018571860187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Andrews v. Pond · Vallett v. Parker · Greenvault v. President of the Farmers & Mechanics' Bank · Wardell v. Howell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 241 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““ * * * If a bill of exchange endorsed in blank, so as to be transferable by delivery, be misappropriated by one to whom it was intrusted, or even if it be lost or stolen, and afterwards negotiated to one having no knowledge of these facts, for a valuable consideration, in the usual course of business, his title would be good * * *. The word notice, as used by this court on the occasion referred to, we think must be understood in the same sense as knowledge, and indeed that is one of its usual and appropriate significations. * * * He [the purchaser] is then to be affected, if at all, by what has occurred between other parties, and he may well claim an exemption from any consequences flowing from their acts, unless it be first shown that he had knowledge of such facts and circumstances at the time the transfer was made. “Nothing less than proof of knowledge of such facts and circumstances can meet the exigencies of such a defence. * * * “According to the rule laid down in Goodman v. Harvey [4 Ad. and Ell. 870], which indubitably is the settled law in all the English courts, proof that the plaintiff had been guilty of gross negligence in acquiring the bill, ought not to defeat his right to recover; and if not, it serves to exemplify the magnitude of the error assumed in the instruction, that any facts and circumstances which would excite the suspicion of a careful and prudent man were sufficient to destroy the title. It is clear that one or the other of these rules must be inco”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The rule may perhaps be said to resolve itself into a question of honesty or dishonesty, for guilty knowledge and wilful ignorance alike involve the result of bad faith. They are the same in effect.” And in Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U. S. 343 , relied upon in case, supra, Mr. Justice Clifford in the court’s opinion, speaking for the court, said: “. . . the question whether the party had such knowledge or not, is a question of fact for the jury, and, like other disputed questions of scienter, must be submitted to their determination, under the instructions of the court; and the proper inquiry is, did the party, seeking to enforce the payment, have knowledge, at the time of the transfer, of the facts and circumstances which impéach the title, as between the antecedent parties to the instrument ? and if the jury found that he did not, then he is entitled to recover, unless the transaction was attended by bad faith, even though the instrument had been lost or stolen. Every one must conduct himself honestly in respect to the antecedent parties, when he takes negotiable paper, in order to acquire a title which will shield him against prior equities. While he is not obliged to make inquiries, he must not wilfully shut his eyes to the means of knowledge which he knows are at hand, as was plainly intimated by Baron Parke in May v. Chapman, 16 Mees. & W. 355, for the reason that such conduct, whether equivalent to notice or not, would be plenary evidence of bad faith.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““But it is a very different matter when it is proposed to impeach the title of a holder for value, by proof of any facts and circumstances outside of the instrument itself. He is then to be affected, if at all, by what has occurred between other parties, and he may well claim an exemption from any consequences flowing from their acts, unless it be first shown that he had knowledge of such facts and circumstances at the time the transfer was made. Nothing less than proof of knowledge of such facts and circumstances can meet the exigencies of such a defense; else the proposition as stated is not true, that a party who acquires commercial paper in the usual course of business, for value and without notice of any defect in the title, may hold it free of all equities between the antecedent parties to the instrument.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.