Wilkinson v. Torres’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 federal appellate · 4 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 105 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “) ) (emphasis omitted). "Where actual deliberation is practical, then an officer's deliberate indifference may suffice to shock the conscience. On the other hand, where a law enforcement officer makes a snap judgment because of an escalating situation, his conduct may only be found to shock the conscience if he acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gantt v. City of Los Angeles · Tatum v. Moody

2. “[o]ur jurisdiction to review an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity ... is limited exclusively to questions of law.” The panel chiefly”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. George v. Morris · Daniels Sharpsmart, Inc. v. Smith

3. “Apprehension by deadly force is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. See Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386 , 395 [ 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 ] (1989). However, an officer using deadly force is entitled to qualified immunity, unless the law was clearly established that the use of force violated the Fourth Amendment. See Brosseau v. Haugen , 543 U.S. 194 , 198 [ 125 S.Ct. 596 , 160 L.Ed.2d 583 ] (2004).... Case law has clearly established that an officer may not use deadly force to apprehend a suspect where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer or others. Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1 , 11 [ 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (1985). On the other hand, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape using deadly force "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others." Id.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Easley v. City of Riverside · Nunez v. City of San Jose