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610 So. 2d 74

Brown v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided December 9, 1992

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1992-12-09

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently March 2000

1 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“If alternative (2) [a true split sentence] is used as the original sentence, the sentencing judge in no instance may order new incarceration that exceeds the remaining balance of the withheld or suspended portion of the original sentence .... The possibility of the violation has already been considered, albeit prospectively, when the judge determined the total period of incarceration and suspended a portion of that sentence, during which the defendant would be on probation. In effect, the judge has sentenced in advance for the contingency of the probation violation, and will not later be permitted to change his or her mind on that matter.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Nelson v. State

Relies on 531 So. 2d 161 - Poore v. State · 553 So. 2d 1371 - Cooper v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1992-12-09

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

THREADGILL, Judge.

¶1Amos Jerome Brown challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court upon the *75revocation of his probation. He argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence upon revocation of probation greater than the balance remaining on the split sentence originally imposed. We agree and reverse.

¶2Mr. Brown pleaded guilty to sexual battery with force likely to cause serious personal injury and was sentenced to a true split sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment, with twelve years suspended to be served on probation. He violated his probation, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment to be followed by twelve years’ probation.

¶3Where a true split sentence is imposed, the sentencing judge in no instance may order new incarceration that exceeds the remaining balance of the suspended portion of the original sentence. Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988); Cooper v. State, 553 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The trial court in this case erred in imposing a sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment because such a sentence exceeds the balance of the suspended portion of the original sentence, namely twelve years.

¶4Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.

DANAHY, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
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