611 So. 2d 1133 - Walker v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “" 'In evaluating the race-neutrality of an attorney's explanation, a court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons . . . are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law. . . . At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation.' Hernandez v. New York , 500 U.S. 352 , ___, 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 1866 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). 'Once the prosecutor has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for challenging the black jurors, the other side can offer evidence showing that the reasons or explanations are merely a sham or pretext.' [ Branch , 526 So.2d] at 624 (citations omitted). " 'The trial judge cannot merely accept the specific reasons given by the prosecutor at face value, see [ People v. ] Hall , 35 Cal.3d [161,] 168, 672 P.2d [854,] 858-59, 197 Cal.Rptr. [71,] 75 [(1983)]; Slappy [ v. State ], 503 So.2d [350,] 356 [(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1987)]; the judge must consider whether the racially neutral explanations are contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination. See Slappy , supra. This evaluation by the trial judge is necessary because it is *Page 265 possible that an attorney, although not intentionally discriminating, may try to find reasons other than race to challenge a black juror, when race may be his primary factor in deciding to strike the juror.' " Id. at 624. See also Ex parte Thomas , 601 So.2d 56 (Ala. 1992) (reversing based on the trial court's accepting the state's reasons”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bush v. State · 667 So. 2d 132 - Newman v. State

2. “[a] prosecutor cannot simply presume, without further questioning to 'dispel any doubt,' that a veniremember, who is under oath, did not answer a question truthfully merely because the prosecutor has hearsay evidence to the contrary.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Naismith v. State · 611 So. 2d 466 - Jones v. State

3. “"These veniremembers did not respond when asked whether they had a fixed opinion against the death penalty or whether they not being absolutely opposed to it, `just [did not] like it,' or when asked whether any veniremember had `a personal, religious, or moral conviction against passing judgment on [his] fellow man.' `[A]n explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is not shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically' is evidence that the reason was a sham or pretext. [ Ex parte ] Branch, 526 So.2d [609] at 624 [(Ala. 1987).] ... Here, there is even stronger basis of concern, because in this case voir dire examination revealed that the two veniremembers in question did not possess the group trait assumed by the prosecutor. The prosecutor could have easily dispelled any doubt, had there been any, by asking a follow-up question specifically of each veniremember. He cannot, however, presume that, in the absence of a response to specific voir dire questioning as to whether the veniremember is in fact opposed to the death penalty, the veniremember would not vote in favor of the death penalty simply because the veniremember is very religious, is a minister or a minister's wife, or even is a member of a particular denomination.... The record offers nothing to give validity to the prosecutor's assumption about these two veniremembers. Compare Coral v. State, [ 628 So.2d 954 ] (Ala.Cr.App.1992) (in a capital case, the striking of a minister's wife was upheld where a”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 785 So. 2d 1174 - Lucy v. State · 838 So. 2d 413 - Smith v. State