612 So. 2d 1335 - Beard v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “When a purported invocation of a Fifth Amendment privilege is ambiguous, the police may question the accused for the narrow purpose of clarifying the equivocal request.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Woods · 791 So. 2d 409 - Gamble v. State

2. “"`The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. See, e.g. , Barnes v. United States , supra, [412 U.S.], at 840 n. 3 [ 93 S.Ct. at 2360 n. 3]. . . . Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination. "`A mandatory presumption is a far more troublesome evidentiary device. For it may affect not only the strength of the "no reasonable doubt" burden but also the placement of that burden; it tells the trier that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. E.g. , Turner v. United States , [ 396 U.S. 398 ,] 401-402, and n. 1 [ 90 S.Ct. 642 , 644-45 , 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970)]; Leary v. United States , 395 U.S. 6 , 30 [”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. State

3. ““ ‘In determining whether the instruction creates a mandatory presumption or a permissive inference, we initially focus on the specific language that .is challenged. If a jury could reasonably have understood that. portion of the jury charge as creating a presumption that relieves the State of its burden of persuasion on an element of the offense, the potentially offending words must be considered in the context of the entire charge. “Other instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption.” [Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 [ 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 ] (1985)] (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 [ 94 S.Ct. 396, 400 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 ] ... (1973)).’ “Coleman v. Butler, 816 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir.1987). See also Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 , 109 S.Ct 2419, 2420 , 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (wherein the Court stated that it ‘explained in Francis [v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985),] and Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979),] that courts should ask whether the presumption in question is mandatory, that is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts’).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Manuel v. State