Duncan v. Honorable Theis’s Empirical Analysis
613 F.2d 305 · 1979
Citation profile
2 district ·
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 751 · 28 U.S.C. § 1651 · 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act) · 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Administrative Procedure Act of 1946)
Relies on Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. · Singleton v. Wulff · Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal. · Hormel v. Helvering · Will v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(2)(A) The regulation promulgated under subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the first sale of crude oil produced in the United States from any lease whose average daily production of crude oil for the preceding calendar year does not exceed ten barrels per well. (B) To qualify for the exemption under this paragraph, a lease must be operating at the maximum feasible rate of production and in accord with recognized conservation practices. (C) Any agency designated by the President under section 5(b) for such purpose is authorized to conduct inspections to insure compliance with this paragraph and shall promulgate and cause to be published regulations implementing the provisions of this paragraph.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Issue. Is an “injection” well a “well” for the purpose of determining whether the average daily production of a property was 10 barrels or less per well in the preceding calendar year, for purposes of the stripper well lease exemption of 10 CFR 210.32? Ruling. No. Under the FEA regulations, the first sale of domestic crude petroleum and petroleum condensates, including natural gas liquids, produced from any stripper well lease, is exempt from the mandatory price and allocation regulations. A stripper well lease is defined as a property whose average daily production did not exceed 10 barrels per day per well during the preceding calendar year. “Average daily production” is further defined in 10 CFR 210.32(b) as: The qualified maximum total production of domestic crude petroleum and petroleum condensates, including natural gas liquids, produced from a property during the preceding calendar year, divided by a number equal to the number of days in that year times the number of wells which produce crude petroleum and petroleum condensates, including natural gas liquids, from that property in that year. Thus, the FEA regulations by their specific language provide that only wells “which produce crude petroleum” are to be counted in calculating average daily production for the purpose of determining whether the stripper well lease exemption applies. While injection techniques help to “produce” crude petroleum, they are not wells which themselves “produce” crude petroleum. Therefore,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“In sum, the present situation is that the consistency of Ruling 1974-29 with the APA has been finally established and, in connection with the ruling on the issue before the court and particularly in dealing with the question of substantial impact, both judges concurring in the result clearly indicated the majority view that the ruling in question did not represent any substantial departure from the meaning of the regulation, and for this reason had no substantial impact as an interpretive ruling. Whether the regulation itself was within the authority of the FEA to promulgate, despite its conceded procedural regularity, or whether it was arbitrary or capricious does not so clearly appear from a consideration of the decision as a whole. The unjustified unwillingness of the government on the one hand to acknowledge this differentiation in its effort to block all further proceedings before Judge Theis by way of discovery or otherwise, and on the other hand the mistaken position of some of the plaintiffs that our decision essentially settled nothing, or at most only the issue of “procedural validity” as affecting the parties involved in the appeal, may account in some measure for the difficulties the lower court and the parties now profess to see within our mandate. Yet, it was rendered clear during the oral argument on the petition for mandamus now before us that the decision of this court set at rest the question of the compliance of the ruling in question with the APA because i”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.