Determan v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Tomka , the plaintiff operated a custom [cattle] feeding operation. 528 N.W.2d at 105 . He sued the manufacturer of a growth hormone given to cattle that the plaintiff had contracted to feed to market weight. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the cattle did not gain weight as quickly as they should have and, as a result, it took the plaintiff longer to raise the cattle to a saleable weight. Id. As a consequence of the extended feeding period, the plaintiffs expenses were greater and he lost money on his custom feeding contracts. Id. Applying the rule set forth in Nelson , we held that the plaintiff could not recover under tort theories of liability because the product simply failed to do what it was supposed to do — promote the cattle’s growth. Id. at 107. We noted that “contract law protects a purchaser’s expectation interest that the product received will be fit for its intended use.” Id. In contrast, in American Fire, we permitted a tort recovery when the defect in the product — a truck — caused a fire that damaged the truck and its contents. 588 N.W.2d at 438 . We observed that “tort theory is generally available when the harm results from ‘a sudden or dangerous occurrence, frequently involving some violence or collision with external objects, resulting from a genuine hazard in the nature of the product defect.’ ” Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nelson, 426 N.W.2d at 125 ).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 398 F. Supp. 2d 992 - Conveyor Co. v. Sunsource Technology Services, Inc.

2. “Here, the defects at issue involve the quality of the home purchased by the plaintiff. Although these defects present a genuine safety hazard to persons and property, that risk has not come to pass. Thus, the injury at present, and the one for which recovery is sought, is limited to repair of the defective construction. The plaintiff is not seeking to recover damages from any “sudden or dangerous occurrence.” See Nelson, 426 N.W.2d at 125 . Rather, the plaintiffs damages result from the deterioration of the house due to its poor construction. The plaintiff argues that because the house presents a danger to its occupants, a tort recovery should be allowed. But this argument ignores the fact that our decision rests on a consideration of not only the type of risk, but also the nature of the defect, the manner in which the injury occurred, and the specific injury for which compensation is sought. Based on a weighing of all of these factors, we conclude that the plaintiffs claim is based on her unfulfilled expectations with respect to the quality of the home she purchased. Accordingly, her remedy lies in contract law, not tort law. See American Fire, 588 N.W.2d at 439 (‘“defects of suitability and quality are redressed through contract actions’” (quoting Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis.2d 918 , 471 N.W.2d 179, 185 (1991))).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 398 F. Supp. 2d 992 - Conveyor Co. v. Sunsource Technology Services, Inc.