Commonwealth v. Walker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

49 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Under Brady , “a prosecutor has an obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material to the guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of an impeachment nature.” Commonwealth v. Spotz [ 610 Pa. 17 ], 18 A.3d 244, 275-76 (Pa.2011) (citation omitted). To establish a Brady violation, appellant must demonstrate: the evidence at issue was favorable to him, because it was either exculpatory or could have been used for impeachment; the prosecution either willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and prejudice ensued. Id., at 276 (citation omitted). “The evidence at issue must have been ‘material evidence that deprived the defendant of a fair trial.’ ... ‘Favorable evidence is material ... if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Id. (citations omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Solano, R. · Commonwealth v. Champney

2. “In Commonwealth v. Dennis, 597 Pa. 159 , 950 A.2d 945 (2008), where the appellant filed his PCRA petition pre McGill and his appellate brief post-McGill, we stated: McGill ... does not save Appellant from the obligation properly to layer his claims before this Court, or from a failure to plead and prove the ineffectiveness of trial counsel sufficiently under Pierce to satisfy the arguable merit prong for an ineffectiveness claim against appellate counsel, any of which will be fatal to his claims.... Id., at 956. However, we note the continuing difficulties in the transitional period following McGill , as the measures outlined there take hold, slowly and erratically, in the lower courts. Indeed, we are still seeing cases, such as the instant one, where the PCRA filings predated McGill , but the appellate brief was filed post-McGill. We are also seeing post-McGill cases where PCRA courts have failed to allow for amendment, an important safeguard contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and emphasized in McGill . Given the complexities posed by these layered ineffectiveness claims, we now conclude the better practice is not to reject claims of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness on the grounds of inadequate development in the appellate brief if the deficiencies in the brief mirror those in the PCRA pleadings, unless the PCRA court invoked these deficiencies as the basis for its decision and afforded an opportunity to amend. Accordingly, McGill’s remand procedure will rema”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Keaton

3. “[T]he better practice is not to reject claims of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness on the grounds of inadequate development in the appellate brief if the deficiencies in the brief mirror those in the PCRA pleadings, unless the PCRA court invoked these deficiencies as the basis for its decision and afforded an opportunity to amend. Accordingly, McGill’s remand procedure will remain an option in eases such as this one, and we will review the underlying claim concerning trial counsel’s stewardship to determine whether remand for further development of the claim pertaining to appellate counsel is required.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Philistin