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614 F.2d 622

Docket No. 79-1997.

United States v. Johnson

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted Feb. 12, 1980.

Decided Feb. 19, 1980.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1980-02-19

2 counsel of record

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (§ 201 of the Gun Control Act of 1968)

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1980-02-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently September 2003

9 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

100198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Walter L. Brady, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

¶2Robert D. Kingsland, U. S. Atty. and Evelyn M. Baker, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

¶3Before GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5This is an appeal from a conviction on three counts of illegal possession of firearms under 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and (i). The sole issue is whether the district court1 erred in denying the defendant’s post-trial motion to strike testimony from the record and suppress evidence. We affirm.

¶6The defendant concedes that a motion to suppress was not filed prior to trial as is required by Rule 12(b)(3) and Rule 41 of Fed.R.Crim.P. Failure to file such a motion prior to trial constitutes a waiver of that defense. Rule 12(f), Fed.R.Crim.P. The defendant contends, however, that the district court abused its discretion in denying him relief from the waiver. He argues that *623inadvertence of counsel and/or the plain error doctrine are sufficient causes for the court to have granted the requested relief.

¶7We disagree. It is apparent that, at the end of trial, the defendant changed his trial strategy (and added new counsel). At trial, his defense was to attack the sufficiency of the evidence. After trial, he attempted a defense strategy of suppressing the evidence. We cannot say, on this record, that the district court abused its discretion in holding that there was no good cause compelling it to grant relief of the waiver.

¶8The district court is affirmed.

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