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614 So. 2d 677

Docket No. 91-2821.

House v. State

John T. HOUSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided March 4, 1993.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1993.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1993-03-04

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently February 2019

5 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(l)(a) In addition to any punishment the court shall order the defendant to make restitution to the victim for: 1. Damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense; and 2. Damage or loss related to the defendant’s criminal episode. ***** * (7) Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence. The burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense is on the state attorney ....”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Montalvo v. State

Relies on 520 So. 2d 276 - State v. Williams · 588 So. 2d 636 - Mansingh v. State · Thomas v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1993-03-04

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Kimberly Fitzpatrick Pell, Panama City, for appellant.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Atty Gen., Carolyn J. Mosley, Asst Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

¶3MICKLE, Judge.

¶4Appellant challenges the order of restitution pursuant to which the trial court held him liable to pay $14,716.17 to Sunland Food Mart. We affirm the order of probation but are compelled to reverse the order of restitution because of the lack of any probative evidence demonstrating the amount ordered constituted "damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense" of grand theft. See sections 775.089(1)(a) (restitution to victim shall be for damage or loss directly or indirectly caused by defendant's criminal conduct) and 948.03(1)(e) (restitution as condition of probation), Florida Statutes (1989); State v. Williams,520 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1988); Mansingh v. State,588 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

¶5The sworn complaint of Sunland Food Mart's general manager stated that Appellant had removed "approximately $2,500.00" from the store's cash receipts. That was the reported amount of loss at the time Appellant entered into a plea agreement to pay "full restitution," and $2,500.00 was the amount Appellant admitted having taken from the store. See Martel v. State,596 So.2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Sunland Food Mart's owner subsequently claimed in a victim impact statement that its "financial, economic or property loss" amounted to the substantially higher figure of $30,297.00. Much of the documentary evidence on which the state relied was subject to the hearsay rule and failed to meet the strict requirements for admissibility under the "business records" exception, on which the state relied. See section 90.801, 90.802 and 90.803(6), Florida Statutes (1989); Beckerman v. Greenbaum,439 So.2d 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Those who testified on the company's behalf could not determine precisely what *678 portion of its losses above $2,500.00, if any, resulted from Appellant's offense. From our review of the record, we find the "waiver" decisions factually distinguishable. See, e.g., Thomas v. State,581 So.2d 992 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Dickens v. State,556 So.2d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). The state did not carry its statutory burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Appellant caused the victim damage or loss in the amount ordered. See section 775.089(7), Florida Statutes (1989); Morel v. State,547 So.2d 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The trial court is instructed on remand to issue an order requiring Appellant to pay $2,500.00 in restitution to Sunland Food Mart. Thomas v. State,480 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

¶6REVERSED and REMANDED.

¶7BOOTH and KAHN, JJ., concur.

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