Griffin v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

178 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 178 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Circumstantial evidence should not be tested by an ultimate “standard for review” different from direct evidence; the standard in both kinds of cases is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt [Emphasis in the original].”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Acevedo v. State · Denby v. State

2. ““[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Wood-by v. INS, 385 U.S. [276] at 282 [ 87 S.Ct. 483, at 486 , 17 L.Ed.2d 362 ] (emphasis added). Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. [356] at 362 [ 92 S.Ct. 1620, at 1624 , 32 L.Ed.2d 152 .] This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon ‘jury’ discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.” 614 S.W.2”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Geesa v. State · Williams v. State

3. “Applying this standard to the case before us, we hold that the evidence of intent to deprive was sufficient to support the conviction. Intent to deprive must be determined from the words and acts of the accused. Banks v. State, 471 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). The appellant's argument is that his driving the taxicab only a few miles and leaving it parked on a street while he walked a mile away from it, means that no rational finder of fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that he had an intent to deprive the owner when he took the cab. It must be remembered that the element which must be proved is not a deprivation, but the defendant's intent to deprive at the time of the taking. The fact that the deprivation later becomes temporary does not automatically mean that there was no intent to deprive permanently or for so long as to satisfy the statutory definition. Draper v. State, 539 S.W.2d 61, 68 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). [Footnote omitted.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cooper v. State · 460 So. 2d 1139 - State v. Eason