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← 615 SO2D 466 - Shaw v. Bourn

Shaw v. Bourn’s Empirical Analysis

1993

Citation profile

14
cited by 14 later decisions
2
states following
February 2005
most recently cited

14 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on 549 So. 2d 840 - Rosell v. Esco · Arceneaux v. Domingue · Canter v. Koehring Company · 397 So. 2d 475 - Bazley v. Tortorich · 365 So. 2d 471 - LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"We hasten to add, however, that our ruling does not mean that the Plaintiffs will not be able to recover against [the tortfeasor] personally. This is a case about personal responsibility. [The tortfeasor] is personally responsible for his acts of molestation and he is personally liable for them. The general theory of insurance is that losses are diffused among all members of society and this makes sense especially in cases of loss due to floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters. But the cost of damage caused by sexual molestation is not a burden that society as a whole should bear. It is an intentional act and it is a burden to be laid squarely upon the shoulders of the molester." In this case, the burden will be borne by Mires. The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “a. which results from an act: (1) that is intended by any insured to cause harm; or (2) that an insured could reasonably expect would cause harm. This Court determined that The use of the words `reasonably' and `an' instead of the word `the' [in the exclusionary clause] indicates that the policy does not look to the subjective fact-based test of the particular insured, but rather uses a reasonable man standard. As such, even if (defendant) is incapable of foreseeing the harm to the plaintiffs which we find was substantially certain to follow his acts of molestation, he should have because any, indeed, every reasonable man expects children to be harmed by molestation. Thus (defendant's) state of mind is irrelevant in light of the policy language.... We further adopt the holding of Doe v. Smith ... and Wallace v. Cappel .... Having concluded that as a matter of law child molestation is an intentional act, we find that the trial court committed reversible error in submitting the question on policy coverage to the jury.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Child molestation is a rare instance in which a factual determination of negligence or intentional conduct is inappropriate as a practical matter. It cannot result from careless conduct and only occurs as a result of a deliberate act by the perpetrator. Molestation of a child is a deliberate act, and therefore is an intentional act.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.