Bishop v. Simonton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The filing of the request for a review of a claim shall suspend the time within which suit must be instituted, in accordance with this Part, until ninety days following notification, by certified mail, as provided in Subsection J of this Section, to the claimant or his attorney of the issuance of the opinion by the medical review panel, in the case of those health care providers covered by this Part, or in the case of a health care provider against whom a claim has been filed under the provisions of this Part, but who has not qualified under this Part, until ninety days following notification by certified mail to the claimant or his attorney by the board that the health care provider is not covered by this Part. The filing of a request for review of a claim shall suspend the running of prescription against all joint and soli-dary obligors, and all joint tortfeasors, including but not limited to health care providers, both qualified and not qualified, to the same extent that prescription is suspended against the party or parties that are the subject of the request for review. Filing a request for review of a malpractice claim as required by this Section with any agency or entity other than the division of administration shall not suspend or interrupt the running of prescription. All requests for review of a malpractice claim identifying additional health care providers shall also be filed with the division of administration. (Emphasis added).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Correro v. Caldwell

2. “Statutes of prescription like these, being remedial in nature, generally apply to all actions instituted after the effective date even though the cause of action accrued before enactment of the legislation. Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521 (La.1979); Rusher v. Winningham Nissan Volvo, Inc., 550 So.2d 784 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989). Exceptions to this general rule of retroactivity for prescriptive statutes, however, include instances where such application would strip a party of a vested right or would revive an already prescribed cause of action. Brown v. Reese, 532 So.2d 187 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988); LeBlanc v. City of Lafayette, 558 So.2d 259 (La. App. 3d Cir.1990). More directly stated, a legislative act cannot revive a cause of action already barred by liberative prescription prior to the effective date of that act. Hall v. Hall, 516 So.2d 119 (La.1987); Small v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury, 589 So.2d 1132 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 593 So.2d 374 (La. 1992); Lyman v. Town of Sunset, 567 So.2d 1171 (La.App. 3d Cir.1990), writ denied, 571 So.2d 648 (La.1990); LeBlanc, supra.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 687 So. 2d 632 - GBF v. Keys

3. “[t]he running of prescription against a health care provider who is answerable in solido with a qualified health care provider against whom a claim has been filed for review under this Part 15shall be suspended in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Correro v. Caldwell