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616 F. App'x 873

Karamjit Singh v. Loretta E. Lynch

U.S. Courts of Appeals

Decided September 24, 2015

U.S. Courts of Appeals · decided 2015-09-24

Applies 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (§ 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))

Relies on Shrestha v. Holder · Ren v. Holder · Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder

Decided 2015-09-24

¶1MEMORANDUM …

¶2Karamjit Singh; his wife, Sukhbir Kaur; and their son, Abhay Jeet Singh1, natives and citizens of India, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“U”) denial of Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review factual findings for substantial evidence, Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir.2014). Substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s and IJ’s adverse credibility determinations. We therefore grant the petition for review.

¶3Singh testified that he was arrested three times in India because of his membership in the Khalra Mission Committee, a human rights organization that advocated a separate Sikh nation of Khalistan.

¶4The BIA rejected the IJ’s reliance on Petitioner’s demeanor as a basis for the adverse credibility determination, but accepted five of the IJ’s credibility reasons for denying Petitioner’s applications. We address each ground below.

¶51. Whether Petitioner was hung upside down during his first arrest. Even the government agrees that this portion of the record is rife with translation difficulties. It is clear that any inconsistency in Petitioner’s answers were due to translation difficulties. When those difficulties were cleared up, Petitioner’s answers were acceptable.

¶62. Whether Petitioner’s son was present at his second arrest. When asked whether his son was present at his June 14, 2006, arrest, Petitioner answered in the affirmative. When reminded, however, that his son was not born until July 8, he changed his answer. What is the materiality of whether his infant son was or was not present? What difference does it make that his son was born before or a few weeks after his second arrest? The question is trivial.

¶73. The time of Petitioner’s first and third arrest. Petitioner testified that his first arrest occurred in the morning, but stated in his asylum declaration that he *875was arrested in the evening. Similarly, he testified that his third arrest occurred in the evening, but his declaration states that it happened at noon. He corrected both answers that he gave on cross-examination. Do mistakes in recounting the details of his three arrests make any difference? We have previously recognized “that victims of abuse often confuse the details of particular incidents, including the time or dates of particular assaults and which specific actions occurred on which specific occasion.” Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1085-86 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶84. Whether Petitioner’s mother can sign her name. Petitioner testified that his mother was illiterate and could not sign her name. He changed his testimony when confronted with an affidavit (which Petitioner introduced) signed by his mother. It would be a rare occasion when a housewife and mother in rural India would be called upon to sign any document, and it may be that Petitioner never saw his mother sign anything. No one contests that she’s illiterate. What purpose would Petitioner have to lie about this subject? In fact, what is its relevance? Any inconsistency is trivial.

¶95. The hospital records. The BIA viewed the hospital records as suspicious because it considered the date in the “Date” block at the head of the record to be the date the letters were written. This date precedes Petitioner’s treatment dates; thus, the suspicion: Under this interpretation it would appear that the letters were written before the treatment took place. But there is another, equally plausible interpretation: That “Date” is the date of Petitioner’s admission to the hospital. This was Petitioner’s testimony. There is no inconsistency.

¶10The inconsistencies the BIA and IJ relied on are either non-existent or trivial, and thus do not constitute substantial evidence in support of the BIA’s and IJ’s adverse credibility determinations. See Zhi, 751 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043-44 (9th Cir.2010) (adverse credibility finding cannot be based only on “utterly trivial” inconsistencies that do not bear on a petitioner’s veracity “under the total circumstances”)). In sum, the BIA’s and IJ’s adverse credibility determinations are not based on substantial evidence.

¶11The petition for review is granted and the case is remanded to the BIA for a determination whether, accepting Petitioner’s testimony as credible, Singh is eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the CAT.

¶12PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED.

¶13 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

¶14. The latter two are derivative petitioners to Karamjit Singh.

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